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I. INTRODUCTION
S TIRRING up old troublemakers. Indeed, opening up the Pandora's
box called "Republicanism" liberates a plethora of historical rascals
bent on haunting the search for a definitional framework for the current
republican revival efforts of legal scholars.' This paper suggests that a
reinterpretation of the role ascribed by historians to one of those maver-
icks is necessary because of the vital role "revolutionary republicanism" 2
1. The republican revival and the critique it has engendered are an effort to reexamine the role
"republicanism" played in our constitutional founding, and to exhume principles which may have
modem currency. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93YALE L. J. 1013
(1984); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STANFORD L. REV. 29 (1985);
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV.
487 (1985); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543 (1986); Horowitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987); Sunstein, Beyond the Rupublican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539
(1988); Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Law's Republic]. Ideas
of public dialogue, civic participation, community responsibility, and an identification of the public
good appeal to a wide range of interests and frustrations prevalent in modem society. Some suggest a
normative function for republican principles emerging as a result of this reexamination-to be em-
ployed as a foundational basis for the work of judges and others. Sunstein, supra at 30-31. Others
suggest that its role may be to help prioritize public values. Sherry, supra at 554. Others warn of the
dangers of eroding hard-fought protections for individual rights, Bell & Bansa, The Republican Revi-
val and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L. 3. 1609 (1988).
In part, the revival has been a response to (as well as a bolstering of) the prominent role of
originalism in the constitutional debate of recent years. It may also be viewed by some as an attack
on the reign of liberalism, a shifting of the focus away from protection of individual rights and
toward implementation of community responsibility and the development of community values. For
the most part, legal scholars responsible for a reconsideration of republicanism have not sought to
distinguish between various strands of republicanism. Sunstein, supra at 31. It is critical, however, at
this stage of the reexamination of republicanism, to make the fine distinctions which influenced the
development of American political and constitutional theory. Buried within this republican tradition
is an understanding of deeply embedded notions of equality and the conditions necessary to en-
courage citizens to participate responsibly in the shaping and maintenance of their government. In
assessing the continuing vitality of these concepts today, in order to ensure a protection of rights,
and to encourage meaningful civic participation and responsibility, further detailed contextual study
of the meaning of republicanism is required.
2. By "revolutionary republicanism" I mean the set of popular ideological beliefs which moti-
vated the mass of people in the American colonies to start thinking of revolution as early as the
1760s, and to start conceiving of a new American government and society. This republicanism incor-
porated a cultural understanding of the unique American context with an emphasis on the social
conditions necessary for an effectual republican form of government. A commitment to the funda-
mental principles of the "equality of rights," referred to passim by virtually all of the era's radical
patriots deeply motivated the people themselves. From this core belief came a commitment by the
general populace to economic, political and social justice, to government by consent of the governed,
equal representation, and an educated citizenry committed to personal and community involvement
in creating a government whose chief aim was a concern for the public welfare.
Further, the revolutionary republicans devised a new way of thinking about constitutional gov-
ernment. Unlike the British system, they were strongly committed to enshrining the spirit of their
Constitution in a text; however, the Constitution was not viewed as a precise document spelling out
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played in explaining at least one radical Republican's comprehensive
plan for emancipation and post-Civil War reconstruction during that
constitutional crisis. Substantive adherence to equality as a condition
precedent to a meaningful republican form of government, as well as a
genuine concern for implementing mechanisms to effectuate that republi-
canism, not only shaped a comprehensive reconstruction alternative, but
also significantly influenced moderate Republicans to accept a more en-
compassing view of equality and reconstruction. To date, the significance
of this republican revival, in the pre-Civil War and Reconstruction peri-
ods and its relevance to the modern debate on republicanism, has not
been recognized.
Previous historical interpretations of the role of the radical Republi-
cans failed to analyze the influence of revolutionary republicanism as a
basis for their legal philosophy and their political action. By characteriz-
ing radical Republicans of the Civil War and Reconstruction era as vin-
dictive, self-serving oppressors of the old South,3 as idealistic,4 or as
all the rules and mechanisms by which those principles underlying the Constitution would be carried
out; rather, they treated the Constitution, like the Declaration of Independence, as embodying the
moral mandates that guided their attempts at self-government. See infra text acompanying notes 18-
96.
3. In the 1890s James Ford Rhodes wrote a multivolumed history of the United States labelling
the Republican Reconstruction "repressive" and "uncivilized pander[ing] to the ignorant negroes,
the knavish white natives and the vulturous adventurers who flocked from the North." K. Stampp,
The Tragic Legend of Reconstruction, in RECONSTRUCTION, AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST
WRITINGS 5-6 (1969), citing J. F. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPRO-
MISE OF 1850 (1902). John W. Burgess, professor of political science and history at Columbia, at the
same time, wrote that reconstruction was "the most soul-sickening spectacle that Americans had
ever been called upon to behold." Id, citing J. W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 1866-1876 (1902). But the most influential scholarship condemning Republican reconstruc-
tion stemmed from the work of William A. Dunning, another Columbia professor, and a whole
school of graduate students who developed a serious historical indictment of the reconstruction pro-
gram and its instigators. Radical Republican legislators were labelled "Jacobins" or "Vindictives"
who refused to adopt President Lincoln's magnanimous program of restoration of the South for their
own economic or sordid motives, replaced Johnson's successful loyal southern governments with
military governments, and gave the ballot to ignorant and irresponsible Negroes and allowed corrup-
tion full reign in the South. Id. at 6, citing W. A. DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION, AND RELATED TOPICs (1898) and RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECO-
NOMIC 1865-1877 (1907). In the 1930s revisionist writers examined the economic incentives underly-
ing reconstruction, but still emphasized the self-serving motives of the radical Republicans. See H.
K. BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR: A STUDY OF ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1930).
See M. L. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 396 n.2 (1974).
Chief among the evil players in the "Dunning School" version was Charles Sumner, the leading
radical Republican in the United States Senate from 1851 until his death in 1872. His own political
philosophy was not seriously explored.
4. The efforts of revisionist historians, beginning as early as the 1930s with the publication of
W.E.B. Du BoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935) and in the reexamination in the
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impractical extremists who endangered the realistic programs of their
more politically astute Republican colleagues in the House of Represent-
atives and in the Senate;5 subsequent historians and legal theorists of dif-
ferent eras ignored the role revolutionary republicanism played in
shaping reconstruction policies and in reaffirming past theoretical
1960s in light of the Civil Rights Movement, most notably by L. Cox & J. COX, POLITICS, PRINCI-
PLE & PREJUDICE, 1865-66: DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (1963), tended to character-
ize the radical Republicans like Charles Sumner, as ones who acted from their conscience; ones who
sincerely believed in the true equality of blacks in all the dimensions of social, political and legal life.
While this was certainly true, there was no further exploration of the source of these hard core
beliefs of the radical Republicans. Consideration of revolutionary republican theory was not a factor
in the analysis.
5. In the 1970s, the focus turned to the contribution of the moderate Republicans; the view
tended to diminish the role of the more radical impractical Republicans, thus avoiding an examina-
tion of the way their ideas forced the moderate Republicans to adopt their philosophies. Instead, all
radical Republicans were considered to share the same idealism, the critical distinction becoming
whether they were willing to compromise in order to implement policies in the legislature. David
Donald, Charles Sumner's biographer, whose two volume life of Sumner focuses on the way Sumner
operated in the Senate rather than on the source of his legal philosophy, categorizes Sumner as an
ultra radical Republican; a man whose ideals blinded him to the pragmatism required in the delicate
balancing between congressional and presidential authority in the mid to late 1860s. D. DONALD,
CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1960) [hereinafter SUMNER AND THE
CIVIL WAR] and CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1970) [hereinafter RIGHTS OF
MAN]. He divided Republicans into "ultras," "practical radicals," "moderate radicals," and "con-
servative radicals." The "ultras" were "doctrinaire, impractical radicals" who often caused real
problems for their more moderate counterparts who were counting votes for legislative enactments
during this sensitive period. The ultra's insisted on racial equality at any cost. "Practical" radicals
shared the goals of their "ultra" counterparts but were, according to Donald, willing to compromise
and delay enactment of complete suffrage and equality pending further negotiation. "Moderates"
acknowledged the need to protect Negroes in the South but refused to employ strong, questionable
constitutional action to effectuate this protection. The "conservatives" staunchly supported Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson and his reinforcement of antebellum governments as the reconstituted "repub-
lican" governments in the South. See D. DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1867
59-64 (1965) [hereinafter POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION]. See also H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL
REPUBLICANS, 339-40 (1968). Sumner is also discussed at length in Michael Les Benedict's treatise,
A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1974) whose title is taken from a Sumner quote: "A moral principle
cannot be compromised." Id. C. Sumner, The Equal Rights of All: The Great Guaranty and Present
Necessity, For the Sake of Security, and To Maintain a Republican Government [hereinafter Equal
Rights of All], Speech in the Senate, on the proposed Amendment of the Constitution fixing the
Basis of Representation (Feb. 5-6, 1866), 39 CONG. GLOBE 673 (1866), reprinted in X THE WORKS
OF CHARLES SUMNER 119 (Lee & Shepard eds. 1870) [hereinafter WORKS]. Benedict essentially
viewed Sumner as an impractical and ineffectual politician who refused to recognize the need for
compromise and often endangered the legislative program of the moderate, practical radicals.
In one of the most recent studies of reconstruction, Eric Foner suggests that historians have
continually failed to provide a "coherent account of Reconstruction" including the "centrality of the
black experience." E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION xxiv (1988). He asserts that "[flrom the enforce-
ment of the rights of citizens to the stubborn problems of economic and racial justice, the issues
central to Reconstruction are as old as the American republic, and as contemporary as the inequali-
ties that still afflict our society." Id. at xxvii.
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grounding for the future development of civil, political and social equal-
ity. Instead of exploring the existence, of whatever significance, of a con-
tinuum of the unique American revolutionary philosophy, legal
jurisprudence in the ensuing generations has treated the recognition of
equality as an aberration springing newly formed from the jaws of aboli-
tion and Civil War. That philosophy, however, stretches back to the ide-
als and theories of radical patriots and freed Negroes in the early
revolutionary era, and even to the colonial recognition of the rights of
suffrage granted to freed male Negroes, males from minority religious
groups and male Indians.6 A recognition of this continuum provides a
more sophisticated understanding of the radical edges of reconstruction.
In viewing it as a hard fought aberration, it is also treated as a benevolent
gift, rather than a recognition of an attempt at synthesis and implementa-
tion of foundational concepts of rights and equality.
An initial foray into the political philosophy of Charles Sumner, one
of the most prominent radical Republicans of the Civil War and Recon-
struction era, peels back several layers of history by providing us with a
mid-nineteenth century view of the relevance of revolutionary republi-
canism to the explosive constitutional crisis of Civil War and Recon-
struction,7 and questions previous interpretation of his role as an
6. Suffrage for the male freed Negroes was hardly a new idea. They had been allowed to vote in
almost all of the former colonies, even in the South, and in many cases were allowed to vote until
very late in the pre-Civil War Era. Although property qualifications were often imposed, in Virginia,
free Negroes were allowed to vote until 1723; in North Carolina, the Act of 1734 eliminated the
former discrimination against Negro voters and was not reenacted until 1835; in South Carolina,
male Jews and free Negro males were allowed to vote until 1716; in Georgia, they voted until 1761;
in Kentucky, they were allowed to vote between 1792 and 1799. In the Southeast, Florida dis-
franchised Negroes in 1845; in Louisiana, they were disfranchised in 1812, Mississippi in 1817, Ala-
bama in 1819, Missouri in 1821, Arkansas in 1836, Texas in 1845. W.E.B. DuBoIs, supra note 4 at
6-7.
7. The purpose of focusing on Charles Sumner, a United States Senator from 1851 until his
death in 1872, is not to assert that he represented the uniform view of Republicans during this
critical time, but to examine the way revolutionary republicanism was utilized as the basis for push-
ing more moderate Republicans toward a more expansive view of equal rights. Although Sumner
was viewed as one of the most radical Republicans, many of his arguments were later accepted by
more pragmatic Republicans in the face of President Andrew Johnson's recalcitrance toward any
effective reconstruction. Sumner's theories were not original; although many historians assert that he
borrowed wholesale from the abolitionists, it is also clear from a close examination of his own papers
that he was enormously influenced by the radical patriots of the revolutionary era. See infra note 17,
for further biographical data on Charles Sumner. Foner asserts that "Sumner's ideas aquired an
increasing following in Republican circles. Sumner's uncompromising stand on black rights, a Cali-
fornian wrote in 1866, had caused many Republicans to reassess their own opinions." E. FONER,
supra note 5, at 230. W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 36-39 (1988) (who documents the indiscriminate intermingling of concepts
of equality, higher law, citizens rights and self-rule).
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extremist, an impractical idealist, and an impediment to more moderate,
practical Republican politicians. Explaining his actions as the natural
consequence of a consistent philosophical interpretation of revolutionary
republicanism lends credence to the view of a radical Republican attempt
at reconstruction, as an effort to force the synthesis of constitutional in-
terpretation with the implementation of a republican form of
government.
Invoking revolutionary republicanism, "the conservatism of 1776,"
Sumner resurrected the principles of early American republicanism: an
emphasis on the social, legal, political and economic conditions essential
to the survival of a republican form of government, and the primacy of
equality of rights as the guiding principle providing the foundational con-
text within which all other rights are embraced and protected.
Foremost is the Equality of All Men. Of course, in a declaration of rights,
no such supreme folly was intended as that all men are created equal in
form or capacity, bodily or mental, -but simply that they are created equal
in rights. This is grandest of the self-evident truths announced, leading and
governing all the rest. Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are among
the inalienable rights; but they are all in subordination to that primal truth.
Here is the starting-point of the whole; and the end is like the starting point.
Announcing that governments derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed, the Declaration repeats the same proclamation of Equal
Rights. Thus is Equality the Alpha and the Omega, wherein all other rights
are embraced. Men may not have a natural right to certain things, but most
clearly they have a natural right to impartial laws, without which justice,
being the end and aim of government, must fail. Equality in rights is the
first of rights. Because these self-evident truths, beginning with Equality,
had been set at nought by Great Britain, in her relations with our fathers,
Independence was declared. To these truths, therefore, was the new Gov-
ernment solemnly dedicated, as it assumed its separate and equal station
among the powers of the earth. Do you ask for the definition of Republic?
Here it is, by patriot lexicographers, whose authority none of us can ques-
tion. (emphasis in original)
8
To Sumner, equality was the "master principle of our system."9
This article demonstrates the link between his theory and praxis
during the crisis of Civil War and reconstruction, and provides one view
8. Equal Rights of All, supra note 4, at 173-74.
9. "The last shall be first; and so, in this new order, Equality, long postponed, shall become the
master principle of our system and the very frontispiece of our constitution." C. Sumner, The Na-
tional Security and the National Faith: Guaranties For the National Freedman and the National
Creditor, Speech at the Republican State Convention, Worcester, Massachusetts (Sept. 14, 1865),
reprinted in IX WORKS 477 [hereinafter National Security and National Faith]. See also W. NELSON
supra note 7, at 9, 70 n.37.
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of republicanism prevalent during the revolutionary and founding era of
American constitutional history.
Part one presents Charles Sumner's view of revolutionary republi-
canism and the social, legal, political and economic conditions necessary
to effectuate that system. An examination is made of Sumner's articula-
tion of republican theory to determine the sources relied upon by him.
His emphasis on equality, and the impact of the society's definition of
equality on "liberty" and the legitimate origins of government, flow di-
rectly from the political philosophy of early radical patriots. His empha-
sis on the mechanisms which ensure a republican form of government:
education, civic participation in and connection with government, land
redistribution and legal protections for social, political and economic
rights echo similar concerns of primary importance to early American
republicanism. His theoretical resolutions of the conflicts of power be-
tween the executive and the legislative branches of government, and his
views on the importance of a strong federalism were shaped by his ac-
ceptance of the theories of early republicans.
In praxis, his efforts from 1840 to 1860 against federal support of
slavery or its extension, against the Fugitive Slave Acts, against "separate
but equal" education, and in favor of jury service for Negroes, as well as
his work with Negro colleagues in this cause, is shown to provide early
evidence of his consistent commitment to this republican theory. 10
Part two discusses Sumner's integration of revolutionary republican-
ism with the constitutional founding. It was his conviction that the Civil
War crisis represented an opportunity to resolve finally the inconsisten-
cies exemplified by the Federalists' adoption of the revolutionary republi-
can idiom, to mollify the people while obfuscating the language of the
Constitution, to accomplish the immediate task of nation building. For
Sumner, the victory over the South and the endorsement of the people in
the elections of 1866 and 1868 mandated a comprehensive program en-
suring true republican forms of government in all of the states and in the
national government; it was a mandate to finally implement the framers'
expectation that a future generation would be forced to spell out the syn-
10. No attempt is made in this piece to provide a discussion of the complete scope of "revolu-
tionary republicanism;" the aim is to present the articulated reliance by one leading radical Republi-
can on his perceived republican heritage, and to examine his view of the relevance of that heritage to
the constitutional crisis he faced. In the process, it is hoped that enough questions will be raised to
spur further debate. See also McDonald, Rights, Republicanism and Equality: Placing Mercy Otis
Warren in the Constitutional Debates of the Eighteenth Century (unpublished manuscript).
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thesis of the principles inherent in the Declaration of Independence and
revolutionary republicanism, with the Constitution.
Part three examines Sumner's application of his theory to issues of
secession, and the problems of presidential authority and reconstruction
in light of revolutionary republicanism. Although Sumner recognized the
conflict over reconstruction in part to stem from the issue of a struggle
for power between the legislative and executive branches, republican the-
ory mandated his course of action in that conflict. He also conceptualized
this conflict as a struggle over the implementation of conditions for genu-
ine republican government versus a veiled reempowerment of rebel sym-
pathizers bent on thwarting any attempt to ensure republican forms of
government in the South. Compromises with President Lincoln's author-
ization of militarily imposed "civilian governments," or with President
Johnson's plans to allow pre-Civil War registered voters to create the
new constitutions, represented a real threat to legitimate republican gov-
ernment in Sumner's view. 1
The intent of this work is to begin to demonstrate the continuing
vitality of "revolutionary republicanism" (long after the demise of classi-
cal republicanism in the American context) 2 by illustrating the way its
11. To Sumner, only a comprehensive reconstruction plan could ensure complete social, polit-
ical and legal rights, including the franchise, education, and possible land redistribution. The in-
volvement of the Congress in ensuring that constitutional change in the states was effectuated by a
truly representative majority of its citizens was consistent with his theory. The southern states who
attempted to secede from the union had vacated their responsibilities to their people to ensure a
republican form of government, thus mandating federal involvement according to constitutional im-
peratives. See infra text accompanying notes 95-136.
12. The examination by legal scholars has utilized the intensive work by historians such as I.
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION (1975); B. BAILYN,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). The debate continues over the exact nature of the
demise of classical republicanism, when in fact the issues may turn on the precise nature of the
survival of an American brand of revolutionary republicanism. An examination of the ideas of the
common people may reveal a far different understanding of what was being ratified in the late 1780s;
the extraordinary deference paid to THE FEDERALIST as the final word on the founders' intent needs
to be reexamined.
Gordon Wood has suggested that the relevance of classical republicanism for American political
theory ended with the ascendancy of the Federalist's new science of politics, represented by the
ratification of the Constitution of the United States. Id. See also, Appleby, Commercial Farming and
the "Agrarian Myth" in the Early Republic, 68 J. AM. HIST. 833 (1982); J. DIGGINS, THE LOST
SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM
(1984); Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 88 AM. HIsT. REV. 629 (1982); Maier, A Pearl
in a Gnarled Shell: Gordon S. Wood's The Creation of the American Republic Reconsidered, 44 Wm.
& MARY Q. 583 (1987); Murrin, Gordon S. Wood and the Search for Liberal America, 44 WM. &
MARY Q. 597 (1987). Other historians disagree, claiming that the influence of classical republican-
[Vol. 38
1990] REPUBLICAN REVIVAL
premise was utilized to prod (with varying degrees of success) pragmatic
Republicans back to "the conservatism of 1776" when equality of rights
had a more encompassing possibility. Operating within the theory of rev-
olutionary republicanism, some radical patriots continued arguments
against slavery, 3 developed republican theories against patriarchal domi-
nation (even in the home), 4 argued for land reform and redistribution of
ism continued throughout the eighteenth century and early part of the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
L. BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); J.
POCOCK, supra. D. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN
AMERICA (1980); Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INTiLLECTUAL HISTORY 116-131 (1979); Bloch, The Constitution
and Culture, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 550 (1987). Bloch deemphasized the focus on classical republican-
ism and points to other roots of republicanism that should be considered: liberalism, Scottish moral
philosophy, Puritanism, and evangelicalism. Id. at 553-54.
Indeed, rather than fading into obscurity in the trail of classical republicanism, the rhetoric, ideol-
ogy, and tradition of revolutionary republicanism is evidenced in varying degrees in the constitu-
tional ratification debates of the late 1780s, in the power shift of 1800, and in the abolitionist and
republican revival of the antebellum and Reconstruction periods.
13. Attacks on slavery were frequent in pamphlets of the pre-revolutionary era. BAILYN, PAM-
PHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74-75 (1975); R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSEDANTISLAV-
ERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1975). See also Okoye, Chattel Slavery as the Nightmare of the
American Revolutionaries 37 WM. & MARY Q. 1 (1980). See, eg., Equal Rights of All, supra note 5,
at 164, citing J. OTIS, RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 29 (1764).
14. See, eg., Lewis, The Republican Wife: Virtue and Seduction in the Early Republic, 44 WM.
& MARY Q. 689 (1987). Professor Lewis describes the republican theory which utilized the concept
of marriage as "a metaphor for their ideal of social and political relationships." Id. Citizens bound
together "not by patriarchy's duty or liberalism's self-interest, but by affection." Id. Marriage was
viewed as an institution which trained its citizens in virtue. According to Professor Lewis, "[t]he
antipatriarchalism of revolutionary ideology dictated that tyranny presented the most immediate
and obvious threat to American happiness, and patriarchal domination the chief obstacle to happy
and virtuous marriage." Id. at 693. The republican solution was to value the wife's function in the
marriage, thus making her an important player in the success of this political venture; however,
according to Lewis, this ideal was by no means a feminist view of equality; "To the extent that the
success of the republican endeavor rested upon the character of citizens, republicanism demanded
virtue of women, not because it numbered them as citizens but because it recognized how intimately
women, in consensual unions, were connected to men." Id. at 699. "Although republican characteri-
zations of marriage echoed with the words equal, mutual, and reciprocal, and marriage was de-
scribed as a friendship between equals. Id. at 707. "Harmony," asserts Lewis, "took
precedence," therefore
the wife had to bend; Deference was the solution republicans offered for the problem of
conflict in the polity... but the fundamental weakness in the republican system was that
it had no power over those who were not or did not want to be virtuous. Even though
republicanism enhanced the woman's status and legitimated improvements in her educa-
tion as well as her entry into benevolent reform movements, it also placed implicit
checks upon her power. The ideal of wife gave way by perhaps 1830 to that of the
mother.
Id at 721. See also Kerber, The Republican Mother: Women and the Enlightenment-An American
Perspective 28 AM. Q. 187 (1976); J. FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY 1750-1800 (1982); Bloch, American Feminine
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wealth,15 and argued against expropriation of Indian lands.'6
The obfuscation of the role played by revolutionary republicanism
in laying the foundations for the political and social fabric of the new
American society, and its continuing relevance for constitutional inter-
pretation, permitted mid-19th century Democrats and conservative
Republicans to label as radical principles and expectations fundamental
to the American founding. 7 An examination of Charles Sumner's adher-
Ideals in Transition: The Rise of the Moral Mother, 1785-1815, FEMINIST STUDIES June 1978, at
101; Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37 (1987); N.
CoTr, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD, WOMAN'S SPHERE IN NEW ENGLAND 1780-1835 (1977).
Sumner opposed an amendment offered to strike out the word "male," thus extending suffrage to
women, when considering amendments to extend suffrage without distinction of color in the District
of Columbia. He indicated that extending the vote to women was "one of the great questions,-
which will be easily settled, whenever the women in any considerable proportion insist that it shall
be settled." C. Sumner, Female Suffrage, and an Educational Test of Male Suffrage, Speech in the
Senate, on Amendments to the Bill Conferring Suffrage without Distinction of Color in the District
of Columbia (Dec. 13, 1866), reprinted in XI WORKS 48. [hereinafter Female Sufferage].
15. See, eg., Nash, Also There at the Creation: Going Beyond Gordon S. Wood, 44 WM. & MARY
Q. 602 (1987) (who asserts, "issues related to the distribution of wealth greatly concerned laboring
people, as well as a few high-placed individuals, and such concerns were voiced not just in Philadel-
phia but in nearly every part of the American colonies."). Id. at 607.
16. See, e.g., 1 M.O. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS AND TERMINATION OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: INTERSPERSED WITH BIOGRAPHICAL, POLITICAL AND MORAL OBSER-
VATIONS, 19-20; Id. at vol. 2, 123; Id. at vol. 3, 314, 345 (1805).
17. Legal scholars, who today justifiably criticize the efforts to revive republicanism because of
its exclusion of the concerns of women of all colors, minorities, and other non-mainstream groups
may need to provide a more complete reexamination of the definitional framework within which the
current debate on republicanism is operating, in order to recapture a tradition (of whatever scope
and magnitude) of concern for the unrepresented in any generation. According to Frank Michelman,
republicanism has been used in legal history as "a dissenting or minority tradition." Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1986).
See also Tushnet, The Concepts of Tradition in Constitutional Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 93, 94 (1987); S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 1788-1850, (1984); Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial
Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988); Kerber, Useful Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1663 (1988); Sulli-
van, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988).
At a minimum the egalitarian idiom, within which the American people debated fundamental
issues of political structures and social relationships, provides substantial justification for further
study of the extent to which these principles survived the Federalist science of politics, and the
emerging American political philosophies. G. WOOD, supra note 12, suggests that the Federalists,
by using the most popular and democratic rhetoric available to explain and justify their
aristocratic system... helped to foreclose the development of an American intellectual
tradition in which differing ideas of politics would be intimately and genuinely related to
differing social interests. . . .By attempting to confront and retard the thrust of the
Revolution the Federalists fixed the terms for future discussion of American politics.
They thus brought the ideology of the Revolution to consummation and created a dis-




ence to this earlier political thought raises new questions about the mean-
ing of republicanism for the revolutionary generation, its impact on
reconstruction legislation, and its relevance to the modem debate on
republicanism."8
Revolutionary republicanism was employed by politicians labelled
the most radical of their age to insist on the broadest interpretation
of equal rights for blacks. The rhetoric and the substance of Charles
Sumner's actions and oratory not only echoed the voices of a people's
past revolution, "but foreshadowed the voices of a future Civil Rights
Movement.
II. THE VOICE AND AUTHORITY OF THE PEOPLE: SUMNER'S VIEW
OF REVOLUTIONARY REPUBLICANISM
A. The Conservatism of 1776: The Primacy of Equality of Rights
Although labelled a radical Republican by his colleagues, and by
modem-historians, Charles Sumner19 thought of himself as conservative.
18. The current debate, on the relevance of previous forms of republicanism to contemporary
concerns, is enhanced by efforts to examine the contextual uses of a particular republican ideology
wherever possible. Although the study of one individual's theory of republicanism during any partic-
ular period cannot provide conclusive evidence of a universal theory of republicanism, it can contrib-
ute an important perspective in the quest for a better understanding of the development and praxis of
republican ideology located in a precise historical context.
19. Election to the United States Senate as a Senator from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
constituted Charles Sumner's first elective office. He served from 1851 until his death on March 11,
1872. A Harvard law graduate, he came early under the influence of Justice Joseph Story (for further
reference to his influence see infra note 59); he joined Horace Mann's fights over quality education in
Massachusetts long before he himself held elective office. His arguments on behalf of equal education
for blacks, as early as 1849, presaged legal battles leading to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) over a hundred years later. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (I Cush.) 198 (1849);
see infra note 69. Labelled as an ultra radical by some, he fought consistently for abolition of slavery,
against the Fugitive Slave Acts, for emancipation, voting rights for blacks, jury service for blacks,
equal education and access to public transportation. See infra text accompanying notes 121-136. He
supported strong measures during reconstruction to ensure that black citizens were assimilated
equally into society; he bitterly fought against President Johnson's acceptance of recalcitrant south-
ern loyalist governments as unrepresentative of the republican governments required by the Consti-
tution. Although he served as a front-runner in the extension of constitutional principles to the
protection of equal rights for all in political, social, economic and legal matters, many of the ideas he
espoused were eventually taken up by the more moderate Republicans during Reconstruction.
Numerous biographies of Sumner exist; many were written during an era when the memory of
Sumner's deeds were viewed as approaching saintly acts. None, however, attempt to integrate Sum-
ner's views on revolutionary republicanism with their explanations for his actions as a Senator. A
more critical biography has been written by David Donald in his two volumes: CHARLES SUMNER
AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1960) and CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN
(1970). Donald focuses primarily on Charles Sumner's efforts to implement his ideals rather than his
theory of republicanism, which motivated his ideals. For other treatments of Sumner, see, W.
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He was synthesizing principles hammered out by the American Revolu-
tion, with constitutional interpretation-principles he believed were pre-
served by the founders in the spirit of the Constitution, yet corrupted by
the growing influence of the "slave power" in ensuing decades. The
growing crisis in the late 1850s and 1860s was not a new revolution to
him, but a
[clontinuance of the American Revolution. It is an effort to carry into effect
the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and to revive in the ad-
ministration of our government the spirit of Washington, Franklin, and Jef-
ferson,-to bring back the Constitution to the principles and practice of its
early Founders,-to the end that it shall promote Freedom, and not Slav-
ery, and shall be administered in harmony with the spirit of Freedom, and
not with the spirit of Slavery. (emphasis in original)20
This notion of a continuance of, rather than a break with the past em-
powered Sumner's philosophy; he found strength in shoring up these fun-
damental principles of republicanism. Before eventually breaking with
the Whig party, he urged them to preserve their past ideology:
The Whigs should be conservators of the ancestral spirit, conservators of
the animating ideas in which our institutions were born. They should pro-
fess the truest and highest conservatism which watches, guards, and pre-
serves the great principles of Truth, Right, Freedom, and Humanity. Such a
conservatism is not narrow and exclusive, but broad and expansive. It is not
trivial and bigoted, but manly and generous. It is the conservatism of '76.
(emphasis added)21
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972); M.L. BENEDICT, A
COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1974); each of these treatments of Sumner has been relied on exten-
sively by me in forming a more thorough understanding of the era and Sumner's participation
therein. Principal reliance, however, is on Sumner's own writings and speeches in order to piece
together Sumner's theory of republicanism. For other treatments of Sumner, see H. TREFOUSSE,
supra note 5; POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 5; M. STOREY, CHARLES SUMNER (1900).
Wherever an independent pamphlet or original copy of a speech was available I used the original,
mindful of the attempt by Sumner to change his speeches after the fact to conform to what he wished
he had said; however, where this was not possible, I still believe Sumner's views, even in 1870 to his
death in 1874 while he edited his works, are relevant to his interpretation of his own philosophy and
the events of the times as they related to republicanism.
20. C. Sumner, Union Among Men of All Parties Against the Slave Power and the Extensions
of Slavery, Speech before a Mass Convention at Worcester (June 28, 1848), reprinted in II WORKS 85
[hereinafter Union Against the Slave Power].
21. C. Sumner, Anti-Slavery Duties of the Whig Party, Speech at the Whig State Convention of
Massachusetts, in Faneuil Hall, Boston (Sept. 23, 1846), reprinted in I WORKS 306. His dedication to
these ideas continued as the crisis grew. In his eulogy after Lincoln's assassination, he attempted to
demonstrate Lincoln's commitment to these same ideas binding the Constitution to the Declaration
of Independence:
The two wars did not differ in scale of operations and in the tramp of mustered hosts
more than in ideas involved. The first was for National Independence; the second was to
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The fundamental structure of Charles Sumner's republicanism
rested on the primary recognition of the principle of equality and on a
belief in the infinite capacity of humanity to improve its condition.22 This
form of republicanism emphasized concentration on the basic conditions
which needed to exist before republican structure had any meaning. Even
principles of liberty, the right to self-governance and justice were defined
by the primary adherence to concepts of equality and to the struggle to
improve the conditions of humanity. Without basic conditions of equal-
ity, freedom itself was essentially meaningless, or distorted by a hierar-
chical claim to that freedom. Like the early American Republicans,
Sumner addressed the substantive primary conditions of republicanism
from which the republican form of government could emerge.23
This emphasis on equality and humanity's capacity for improvement
drew its strength from the initial voices of American republicanism.
Sumner credits James Otis, Jr., whom he refers to as "the John the Bap-
make the Republic one and indivisible, on the indestructible foundations of Liberty and
Equality. The first cut the connection with the mother country, and opened the way to
the duties and advantages of Popular Government; the second will have failed, unless it
consummates all the original promises of the Declaration our fathers took upon their lips
when they became a Nation. In the relation of cause and effect the first was natural
precursor and herald of the second. (emphasis in origial)
C. Sumner, Promises of the Declaration of Independence, and Abraham Lincoln, Eulogy on Abra-
ham Lincoln, Before the Municipal Authorities of the City of Boston (June 1, 1865), reprinted in IX
WORKS 370-71 [hereinafter, Promises of the Declaration of Independence]. He emphasized Lincoln's
dedication to these principles.
The inevitable topic to which he returned with most frequency, and to which he clung
with all the grasp of his soul, was the practical character of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence in announcing the liberty and equality of all men. No idle words were there, but
substantial truth, binding on the conscience of mankind.
M. STOREY, supra note 19, at 292.
22. C. Sumner, The Law of Human Progress, Oration before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of
Union College, Schenectady (July 25, 1848), reprinted in II WORKS 91 [hereinafter, Law of Human
Progress]; Equal Rights of All, supra note 5.
23. Morton Horowitz suggests that the two republican themes requiring "equality of condition"
and the need for "small societies" were integrally connected. There was an emphasis on the social
conditions and the development of human and public character in order to have a stable republican
government instead of the "liberal emphasis on institutional equilibrium." Horowitz, supra note 1, at
72. The antifederalist criticism of a large republic was interpreted by Federalists as mere local pro-
tectionism when it may in fact have been a concern for an environment wherein the requisite ele-
ments of a republic could exist. Horowitz suggests that "French and Scottish Enlightenments, not
eighteenth-century English opposition thought, provided republicans with the categories for analyz-
ing the connection between a public-spirited citizenry and a relatively equal and active citizenry." Id.
at 73. Liberalism, he argues, in order to justify the large republic, had to "break with the classical
republican analysis that closely identified the character of governmental institutions with the struc-
ture of social conditions." Id. at 72.
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tist of the American revolution,"24 as the initial enunciator of these basic
principles in the colonies, igniting the opposition leading to the Revolu-
tionary War.25
It was critical for Sumner to identify the principles of the radical
patriots with the principles which permeated the Revolutionary War ef-
fort and which were included in the foundations of the government cre-
ated as a result of those efforts. He wanted to ground his battles for equal
rights in this foundational revolutionary discourse. Otis appears to have
had a profound influence on Sumner's perspective. According to Sumner,
Otis, who first argued that republicanism hinged on equality
[f]irmly ... planted himself on the Rights of Man, which he insisted were,
by the everlasting Law of Nature, inherent and inalienable: and these rights,
he nobly proclaimed, were common to all, without distinction of color. To
suppose them surrendered in any other way than by equal rules and general
consent was to suppose men idiot or mad, whose acts are not binding. (em-
phasis in original)R
He cites further to Otis in support of his interpretation of the mean-
ing of a republican form of government, referring to Otis' pamphlet, The
Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in 1764, as,
the most remarkable pamphlet of our country, and one of the most remark-
able ever written .... [MIere are not only the truths asserted by our fathers,
but the unanswerable arguments by which they were vindicated... [t]he
character of this Defence of the American People.. .where, as in gleams,
may be discerned the Idea of a Republic. (emphasis in original)27
Otis emphasized that "the first simple principle is Equality and the
Power of the Whole," and as Sumner restates it, "the Equality of All and
24. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 164.
25. Id. at 165. Sumner credits Otis with inspiring the revolutionary spirit and connecting the
idea of the consent of the governed and the inalienable rights of man with the revolutionary efforts.
He cites John Adams, referring to Otis' speech against the Writs of Assistance, "American Indepen-
dence was then and there born; the seeds of patriots and heroes was then and there sown, to defend
the vigorous youth .... Then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbi-
trary claims of Great Britain." Id. at 160, citing John Adams, letter to William Tudor (Mar. 29,
1817). Sumner claimed that this speech "was the most important, down to that occasion, ever made
on this side of the ocean." Id. at 158. He also cites Adams' characterization of Otis' speech and
pamphlet, A VINDICATION OF THE CONDUCT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROV-
INCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, as continuing "in solid substance, all that is found in the Declara-
tion of Rights and Wrongs issued by Congress in 1774, the Declaration of Independence in 1776,
and the subsequent writings of those political philosophers who upheld the national cause." Id. at
162, citing John Adams, Letter to William Tudor (Apr. 5, 1818). See also Ferguson, Reason in
Madness: The Political Thought ofJames Otis, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 194 (1974).
26. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 159.
27. Id. at 163. Cf B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
176-81, 205-08 (1967) (for a different view of the cohesiveness of Otis' theories).
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the Power of All!-the two buttresses of a just government.""8
Otis, too, considered slavery anathema to the idea of true republican
representative government:
The colonists are by the law of nature free-born, as indeed all men are,
white or black.. .Does it follow that't is right to enslave a man because he is
black? Will short curled hair, like wool, instead of Christian hair, as't is
called by those whose hearts are as hard as the nether millstone, help the
argument? []n a state of Nature no man can take my property from me
without my consent. If he does he deprives me of my liberty and makes me a
slave .... The very act of taxing, exercised over those who are not repre-
sented, appears to me to be depriving them of one of their most essential
rights as freemen, and, if continued, seems to be in effect an entire dis-
franchisement of every civil right. (emphasis added)
29
Revolutionary republicanism, for Sumner, depended upon this rec-
ognition of the primacy of the principle of equality of rights. Even the
recognized legitimacy of the government depended upon this principle;
for the consent of the governed could not be accomplished if the defini-
tion of those governed did not include all on an equal basis.3 0 Encourage-
ment of the development of civic virtue by educational opportunities,
citizen participation in self-government by jury service, public debate and
public service, depended on assumptions that equal rights had to exist
first. The common good was meaningless unless all could participate, by
true representation, in the deliberation of goals necessary for its achieve-
ment. A republican system built without this foundational agreement
was a house of straw.
B. Humanity's Capacity for Improvement
Sumner's republicanism was conditioned upon humanity's infinite
capacity for improvement. The "Law of Human Progress," to which he
ascribed,3 moved individuals, societies, nations and humanity as a
whole, toward a gradual improvement of conditions-economic, social,
legal and moral. In Sumner's view, no universal standard discovered by
"the ancients" could be cast in stone for eternity's benefit. Classical re-
28. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 159.
29. Id. at 164. Sumner added the voice of Samuel Adams, who likened the taxation without
legal representation to being "reduced from the character of free subjects to the miserable state of
tributary slaves." Id. at 165. See also C. Sumner, Political Equality Without Distinction of Color,
Second Speech in the Senate on the proposed Amendment of the Constitution fixing the Basis of
Representation (Mar. 7, 1866), reprinted in X WORKS 282, 294-98.
30. Sumner exhibits some embarrassment with his own inconsistency here in his reluctance to
include the cause of women's equality at this time. See supra note 14.
31. Law of Human Progress, supra note 22.
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publicanism represented the infancy of the philosophy of republicanism,
but hardly its pinnacle of achievement.3 2
Citing Thomas Jefferson, Sumner stressed a recognition for the im-
provability of the mind and reformation of institutions based upon im-
provements in science .3  According to Sumner, "[m]an as an individual
is capable of indefinite improvement. Societies, which are but aggrega-
tions of men, and finally the Human Family, or collective Humanity, are
capable of indefinite improvement and this is the destiny of man, of socie-
ties, of nations, and of the Human Family.
' '3 4
This belief in the inevitable progress of human development
strengthened Sumner's reverence for the more recent principles of the
American Revolution and the synthesis required by modern understand-
ing; it also made him more willing to reject the hierarchical stratification
of society upon which the ancient civilizations depended. He also be-
lieved as a core part of his republican ethic, that it was his duty to further
the progress of human development by all available means.35
C. The Influence of Classical Republicanism
Sumner's view of human progress and the lessons learned from each
succeeding generation made him view the recent American Revolution
and founding era as more relevant than the lessons of antiquity. He dis-
32. Id.
33. Jefferson, addressing concerns raised by John Adams, suggests that, "The enemies of re-
form, on the other hand, denied improvements, and advocated steady adherence to the principles,
practices, and institutions of our fathers, which they represented as the consummation of wisdom,
and make of excellence, beyond which the human mind could never advance." Jefferson disagreed,
however, and admonished Adams for his prediction that even the freedom of inquiry "will produce
nothing more worthy of transmission to posterity, than the principles, institutions, and systems of
education received from their ancestors" since Adams, according to Jefferson, as a man of science,
knew better of the things still unknown and unexplored. G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA, JEFFER-
SON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE xxiii (1978).
34. Law of Human Progress, supra note 22, at 115. Sumner also relied on Descartes, Pascal,
Fontanelle and Turgot for his own view that man possessed a capacity of indefinite improvement not
only in the arts and sciences, but in moral and political development as well. Law of Human Pro-
gress, supra note 21, at 106-15, citing DESCARTES, DISCOURS DE IA METHODE Euvres, Tom I. pp.
192-193; PASCAL, PENSEtS Part I. Art I, DE L'AUTORITE EN MATIERE DE PHILOSOPHIE
Euvres,(ed. Bossut, 1779), Tom. II. Id. at 107; FONTANELLE, DIGRESSION SUR LES ANCIENS ET LES
MODERNE: Euvres, Tom. II, p.249. Id. at 109. TURGOT, PLAN DE DEUX DISCOURS SUR
L'HISTOIRE UNUNIVERSELLE, Euvres, Tom. II. pp.626-667. Id. at 111.
,He cites similar support for these ideas in Italy by GIAMBATTISTA Vico, THE PRINCIPLES OF A
NEW SCIENCE CONCERNING THE COMMON NATURE OF NATIONS (1725). Id. at 102. And in Ger-
many by LEIBNrrz, OPERA OMNIA, (ed. Dutens), Tom. VI, p.309. Id. at 104. Sumner also cites
Lessing, and HERDER, PHILOSOPHY Or HISTORY. Id. at 105.
35. Law of Human Progress, supra note 22, at 93-94.
REPUBLICAN REVIVAL
couraged emphasis on antiquity's definitions of republicanism because
the unique American experience required separate examination.
It was necessary for Sumner to separate out references to classical
republicanism as the model for current debate, by propounding a view of
American exceptionalism.36 Antiquity's views of equality failed to pro-
vide answers for the crisis Sumner hoped to resolve; the unique nature of
the American condition spawned a new breed of republicanism, one
whose basic foundation rested on the unique conditions encouraging a
recognition of equality of rights for all persons.37
Sumner's revolutionary republicanism distinguished itself from
classical republicanism by the uniqueness of the American experience,
and the primacy of equality as a fundamental of human nature. He
looked to the principles enunciated by the early patriots of the American
Revolution, the heightened involvement of the citizens of the colonies,
and the expectations that their principles were what the war was all
about and would thus be represented in any new government created by
the new country.
References to ancient republics or the experience of history outside
the revolutionary American experiment aided the understanding of gen-
eral aims and goals of a republic, but diverted one from a recognition of
the creation of a unique form of republican government, not previously
existing in the world. The mistake often made by other critics, and in this
Sumner included his contemporary colleagues in the Senate, stemmed
from comparisons to antiquity or more modern history for comprehen-
sive and conclusive definitions of the American republican form of gov-
ernment.38 He rejected the inconsistent and vague definitions of a
36. Both Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood have attacked the myth of American exceptional-
ism by contending that the influence of classical republicanism, and more directly eighteenth century
radical opposition philosophy, were responsible for American republicanism. As the discussion supra
note I 1 indicates, others have attempted to demonstrate the continuing influence of classical republi-
canism in American political consciousness.
37. For Sumner, the need to separate out American republicanism from classical republicanism
was clear:
[b]ut exalted as these productions may be, it is impossible not to perceive that something
of their present importance is derived from the early period when they appeared, some-
thing from the unquestioning and high flown admiration of them transmitted through
successive generations until it became a habit, and something also from the disposition,
still prevalent, to elevate antiquity at the expense of subsequent ages .... The people were
ignorant, vicious, and poor, or degraded to abject slavery-itself the sum of all injustice
and all vice.
Law of Human Progress, supra note 22, at 116.
38. If others have thus far failed, it is because they have looked across the sea instead of at
home, and have searched foreign history and example instead of simply recognizing the
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republic logically flowing from classical experiences with a republic: "I
put aside all illustration derived from speculations of ancient philoso-
phers, because, on careful examination it appears that the term "Repub-
lic," as used by them, was so absolutely different from any idea among us
as to exclude their definition from the debate."
39
Though he admired Montesquieu's definition of virtue: "a love of
country, which he says is a love of equality" as the inspiring principle of
a republic, Montesquieu's inclusion of an aristocracy, "where the sover-
eign power is in the hands of part of the people" was repugnant to Amer-
ican republicanism.'
Definitions by these philosophers embraced all organized govern-
ments, including monarchies, aristocracies, democracies or some combi-
nation of all these characteristics. Nowhere did the definitions offered
include a concern with the government's character or with the unique
conditions of the American experience.4'
D. Turning Toward an American Creation
Sumner believed that American revolutionary republicanism sought
to incorporate all of the "virtues accorded to the ideal commonwealth."42
For his ideal commonwealth which he believed the revolution had man-
dated, Sumner extracted two principles upon which he placed enormous
importance for his view of republicanism: "justice," and "the duty of
seeking the general welfare." In order to obtain these goals, the imple-
mentation of underlying concepts inherent in republicanism, particularly
the core principle of equality of rights, needed to be safeguarded.43 "Jus-
tice" depended on a preliminary acceptance of the principle of equality;
for without it, justice was meaningless. "The duty of seeking the general
history and example of their own country. They have imported inapplicable and uncer-
tain definitions, forgetting that the Fathers, by positive conduct, by solemn utterances,
by declared opinions, and by public acts, all in harmony and constituting one over-
whelming testimony, exhibited their idea of a republican government in a way at once
applicable and certain. They are the natural interpreters of their own constitution.
Equal Rights of All, supra note 22, at 152-53. Whether they drew their lineage from a devotion to
English radical Whig theory or classical republicanism, a desire to implement unsullied British con-
stitutionalism, civic humanitarianism, evangelicalism, or a blend of them all, the unique American
situation, with its isolated geographical position vis a vis the threatening influence of European mon-
archies, and its experience with virtual political, social and religious autonomy, as well as its relative
abundance of land and wealth, created a breed of republicanism totally American.
39. Id. at 144.
40. Id. at 149.
41. Id. at 144.




welfare" was intertwined with his strong belief in humanity's infinite ca-
pacity to improve the conditions of humanity and the resultant duties
imposed thereby.
The principles at issue during the American Revolution were crystal
clear to Sumner. He argued that those values, endangered by the mother
country, were "self-evident" to the new American people as were the
reasons for the war itself. "The first object," according to Sumner,
[w]as not independence, but the establishment of these principles; and when
at last independence began, it was because these principles could be secured
in no other way. Therefore, the triumph of independence was the triumph
of these principles, which necessarily entered into and became the animat-
ing soul of the Republic then and there born.
44
E. Equality and Representation
For Sumner, the principle of equality was forever entwined with his
view of representative government, whether he was dealing with a fair
system of legislative apportionment,45 the growing imbalance of slave
holding states' voting strength in the United States Congress in the pre-
Civil War era,46 or multiple proposals for excluding Negro franchisement
after the war.47
Equality of representation was a core value of Sumner's republican-
ism. He viewed it as a unique attribute of the revolutionary American
form of government, as spelled out by the early founding fathers, that
could not be distorted:
[i]f this representation is equal, it is perfect; as far as it deviates from this
equality, so far it is imperfect, and approaches to that state of slavery; and
the want of a just weight in representation is an evil nearly akin to being
totally destitute of it. An inequality of representation has been justly es-
teemed the cause which has in a great degree sapped the foundation of the
once admired, but now tottering fabric of the British Empire; and we fear,
44. Id. at 154-55.
45. "But America has added to the Representative System another principle, without which it is
incomplete, and which, in the course of events, is destined, I cannot doubt, to find acceptance wher-
ever the Representative System is employed: I mean the principle of equality." (emphasis in original)
C. Sumner, The Representative System, and its Proper Basis, Speech on the Proposition to Amend
the Basis of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, in the Convention to revise and amend
the Constitution of that State (July 7, 1853), reprinted in III WORKS 236 [hereinafter Representative
System].
46. C. Sumner, Issues of the Presidential Election, Speech before the New York Young Men's
Republican Union, at Cooper Institute (Nov. 5, 1864), reprinted in IX WORKS 113.
47. See Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, (Dec. 8, 1863) (proposing rec-
ognition of loyal governments when 10 percent of the 1860 voters approved, thus avoiding the ques-
tion of black suffrage), RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 4, at 178-79.
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that, if a different mode of representation from the present is not adopted in
this Colony, our Constitution will not continue to that late period of time
which the glowing heart of every true American now anticipates .... 48
According to Sumner, the radical patriots were confirmed in their
outrage against Parliament's attempts to tax them by the principles of
both John Locke and Algernon Sidney; he recognized Locke as the
source of two fundamental truths: "that all political society stands only
on the consent of the governed and that taxation without representation
is an invasion of fundamental right."4 9 The radical patriots, borrowing
from Locke, made taxation without representation and the protection of
rights their battle cry.
Resolutions by colonial governments, the Declaration of Colonial
Rights and Grievances in 1765, and the acts of the Continental Congress
all demonstrated to Sumner that the principles which inspired individual
radical patriots to voice opposition reflected the organized voice of the
American people during the Revolutionary War."0
"Virtual representation," a defense posited by the ministers of Great
Britain, flaunted basic principles of revolutionary republicanism as it was
48. Representative System, supra note 45, at 236. Fully ten years later he evoked these same
concerns.
[A]nd you are now to decide, whether in the discharge of imperative duties under the
National Constitution and bound to guaranty a republican form of government, you will
disfranchise this latter mass, shutting them out from those Equal Rights promised by
our fathers, and from all copartnership in the government of their country. They surpass
in numbers, by at least a million, the whole population of the Colonies at the time our
fathers raised the cry, "Taxation without Representation is Tyranny"; and now you are
to decide whether to strip them of representation, while you subject them to grinding
taxation by tariff and excise, acting directly and indirectly, dwarfing into insignificance
everything attempted by the British Parliament.
Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 204-05.
49. Id. Sumner traces these principles even further to earlier French history for further support
of these basic ideas; however, it was the wholesale adoption of these principles by the radical patriots
and their translation of these into action that fascinated Sumner.
50. Resolutions introduced by Patrick Henry in Virginia emphasized that the people them-
selves, or "by the people chosen by themselves to represent them" are the only ones who can know
what taxes they are able to bear and "must themselves be affected by every tax laid on the peo-
pIe,..." Id. at 167. As a result of efforts made by James Otis in Massachusetts, a Congress met in
New York in October, 1765 resulting in a Declaration of Colonial Rights and Grievances, declaring:
"That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people, and the undoubted right of an English-
men, that no taxes be imposed on them but with their own consent, given personally or by their
representatives." Id. at 167-68. The Continental Congress immediately passed resolutions recogniz-
ing "the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, as natural rights," and that no colonists could be
held to any law to "which they had not consented by representatives. . . .'The foundation of English
Liberty and of all free government... is a right in the people to participate in their legislative coun-
cil.'" (emphasis in original) Id. at 170, quoting JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, Oct. 12, 1774, at 29,
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being developed by the radical patriots and as it was later to be adopted
by Sumner. Since all thirteen colonies were considered, in their original
charters, to "hold of the manor of Greenwich in Kent" and thus be rep-
resented by the Members in Parliament from Kent County, they could be
taxed since they were "virtually" represented." However, representative
government meant direct representation and the consent of the governed,
and control, by election, over those elected; the radical patriots re-
sponded with the conclusion that "where there is taxation without repre-
sentation, resistance is justifiable .... -"s Sumner concluded that,
[i]ndependence was the means to an end, and that end was nothing less than
a Republic, with Liberty and Equality as animating principles, where gov-
ernment stood on the consent of the governed, or, which is the same thing,
where there should be no taxation without representation: for here was the
distinctive feature of American institutions.'
The vehement reaction of the radical patriots during the pre-Revo-
lutionary War period against the concept of "virtual representation"
strongly influenced Sumner's own interpretation of the nature of repre-
sentation." He clung to the pre-revolutionary view of "mirror image rep-
resentation;" that is, that the representative should resemble his
constituents and reflect their concerns as much as possible, rather than
the more attenuated national representation of self-interest groups pos-
ited by Madison in The Federalist No. 10.55 He was, however, a strong
nationalist unlike many antifederalists who employed this view of repre-
sentation during the ratification debates in the late 1780s, in an effort to
defeat the strength of the national government.
Sumner described his view of the character of representation as
early as 1853 when he participated in the fight over amendments to the
Massachusetts Constitution to remedy unfair apportionment in the state
51. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 171, quoting Speech on Motion for withdrawing Confi-
dence from Ministers (Mar. 15, 1782) XXII HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY HIsToRY 1184. See B.
BAILYN, supra note 27, at 167-70 (for additional discussions of the concept of virtual representation
as viewed by the revolutionaries).
52. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 172.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Ackerman, supra note 1, for Sumner's use of an appeal to the people in developing the
structure of higher constitutional politics. Sumner was less willing to rely on the separation of pow-
ers as the natural check on the activities of the three branches of government that purported to
represent the people; his appeals to the people, while not made for ordinary, everyday considera-
tions, inherently recognized the inabilities of the three branches to fully represent the people. He
recognized that there were extraordinary questions that ought to be appealed to the populace at




legislature.16 Typical of his strategic and philosophical perspective, he
relied for support on historical justification to bolster his arguments. He
cuoted with favor abortive efforts, in 1777 and 1778, by Essex County, to
insist on equal representation:
The rights of representation should be so equally and distributed, that the
representatives should have the same views and interests with the people at
large. They should think, feel and act like them, and in fine, should be an
exact miniature of their constituents. They should be, if we may use the
expression, the whole body politic, with all its property, rights and privi-
leges reduced to smaller scale, everypart being diminished in just proportion.
(emphasis added)
57
F. Sumner's Style of Representation
Sumner's convictions were deeply populist.58 His goal was always to
expand the inclusiveness of the definition of citizen, and expand partici-
pation in government as well as in society for all persons. As an advocate
for equal rights for all, he was not above shaping an interpretation of
history to support his arguments; however, in examining the past, in at-
tempting to uncover the historical justifications for equality, he tapped
the roots of early American republicanism, drawing on the radical patri-
ots to bolster the validity of his constitutional claims. Sumner did not
worry about the imposition of a universal morality; to him, as to some
revolutionary republicans, the nature of civic virtue was relational. The
goal was not to enforce uniform private belief systems but to achieve
character through participation in government aimed at the public good.
Sumner attempted to mesh his view of representation with his sup-
56. The Convention was called in Massachusetts to amend the constitution to change the basis
of the scheme of representation in the legislature focusing on the problem of allowing the "towns" to
send several representatives. Because of the increase in towns and an unequal distribution of popula-
tion throughout the commonwealth, this method had become inequitable. Sumner was adamant in
viewing the origin of the representative system in the United States as grounded firmly on equality.
Representative System, supra note 45, at 229.
57. Id. at 237-38.
58. An ever expanding notion of citizenship was crucial to Sumner's theory; he believed in full
participation and rejuvenation of government by its citizens in both the daily fulfillment of reciprocal
obligations and in the critical stages of redefinition and constitutional change. For other discussions
of the importance of citizenship see Ackerman, supra note 1; Law's Republic, supra note 1, at 1517-
521. Foner, in comparing the two eras, states, [1like the republicanism of the American Revolution,
Reconstruction Radicalism was first and foremost a civic ideology, grounded in a definition of Amer-
ican citizenship." E. FONER, supra note 5, at 233. See generally discussion by G. WOOD, supra note
12, at 162-96, (for the importance of mirror representation). See also Ackerman, supra note 1, (for a
view of mimetic and semiotic representation).
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port for a strong national government. 59 He never advocated that the
constituents could instruct their representatives in each vote and action;
Massachusetts citizens had already accepted the concept of representa-
tion which deviated from direct instruction, and his view of republican-
ism kept him sensitive to the needs of his constituency. At times,
however, his view of his constituency, as all of the advocates of liberty
and full social equality for Negroes, gave him maneuvering room within
his scope as a Republican senator. He operated under the strong convic-
tion that he perfectly reflected his conception of republicanism, as well as
the overwhelming sentiment of his constituency, by his views on protec-
tion of human rights, and particularly, his views on emancipation and
suffrage for Negroes.
His style of operation in the Senate reflected his belief that he was
"as one" with his constituency. A direct appeal to the people, over the
heads of his colleagues and even his party, became his modus operandi.
In many instances his speeches were aimed not at persuading his fellow
Senators, but at informing and marshalling the public sentiment behind
his cause-the cause, he believed, of his constituency.6" He refused to
compromise; he refused to participate in the ordinary wheeling and deal-
ing of self-interested politics anticipated by The Federalist No. 10; he
59. Sumner was strongly influenced by the views of Justice Joseph Story, Dane Professor of Law
at Harvard, who was a strong Republican and nationalist. Story justified his push for broader nation-
alistic powers with republicanism by arguing that states' "rights theorists were anti-majoritarian,
and thus anti-republican." He viewed the majority of the people as a whole in the nation, as the true
majority and not the majority of the people in any one state. Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on
the Constitution, 94 YALE L.J 1285, 1303 (1985). Professor Powell asserts that, "the Commentaries
were a massive attempt to prove that the doctrines-nationalism, expansive construction of federal
power, and judicial supremacy-for which Story stood and which Jefferson opposed were in fact the
logical conclusions of a truly republican faith." Id. at 1301. Story, too, according to Powell, believed
in equality as "an indispensable basis for republican government, both in order to avoid dividing the
sovereign people into mutually hostile ranks or estates, and to inculcate that sense of civic pride and
duty necessary to the healthy functioning of majority rule." Id.
60. See RIGTS OF MAN, supra note 5, at 229. Sumner learned early that public opinion played
an important role in acceptance of maverick principles. His first public speech on July 4, 1845, to the
elders of the City of Boston involved a diatribe against war and was received by a hostile audience at
the time; however, copies were circulated and reprinted in various papers and the public reaction
thrust Sumner into the political limelight. He learned that the public was his audience, and he with-
stood the bored or hostile reactions of his colleagues in his efforts to get his message across to his
constituency. C. Sumner, The True Grandeur of Nations, An Oration Delivered Before the Authori-
ties of the City of Boston, (July 4, 1845), reprinted in I WORKS 1. [hereinafter Grandeur of Nations).
Of particular importance in evoking public response were his speeches on the barbarism of slavery,
which provided the history of slavery and the principles against it. This speech was ridiculed in the
Senate but had an enormous impact upon public opinion. C. Sumner, The Barbarism of Slavery,
Speech on the bill for the admission of Kansas as a Free State. (June 4, 1860), reprinted in VII
WORKS 171; Equal Rights of All, supra note 5.
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read long but informative speeches in the Senate and then publicized
them by private reprints throughout Massachusetts, and in some cases,
throughout the country.6 Although one scholar has characterized his
style as "government by exhortation," 62 his actions were consistent with
his view of representative government; his constituency played a vital
role in his view of representative government. Sumner wanted to operate
on a higher plane than some of his more pragmatic colleagues; he justi-
fied his actions as spurred by moral and legal compulsion demanding
total equality. For him, his situation was similar to the radical patriots
with whom he so steadfastly identified-they too shunned the pragmatic
in order to demand their ideals. Other Republicans operated on a more
pragmatic level; while some certainly shared his ideals, they responded to
a level of normal politics, to the need to be re-elected, to the need to
maintain control of the Senate in the face of the threat of southern Dem-
ocratic control, and the need to respond to their own party's President.
Sumner accepted their operation in the same way he viewed the Federal-
ist's compromise of the slavery question, as a response to pragmatics-
postponing to a later generation the ultimate resolution of the higher
moral question of constitutional guaranties of equal rights for all.
While many scholars have labeled him as "unpragmatic," "extrem-
ist," "doctrinaire," and totally unrealistic in the performance of his sena-
torial duties-a burden to the pragmatic, moderate republicans who
faced the political realities of the day 6 -he is also credited with playing
a key role in raising public support for emancipation and reconstruction.
61. According to Donald, over 20,000 copies of his Worcester Convention address on Septem-
ber 14, 1865 were published, but Sumner was not content with this circulation of his protests of
President Johnson's policies; he assembled a collection of his past speeches and resolutions and pub-
lished a pamphlet entitled SECURITY AND RECONCILIATION FOR THE FUTURE and extensively cir-
culated it throughout the country. RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 5, at 228.
62. F. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS, SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH 120 (1959).
63. POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 5, at 59-64; M.L. BENEDICT, supra note 3; see
RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 4; H. L. TREFOUSSE supra note 5, at 339-40. Benedict differentiates
between political and legislative radicalism noting Sumner's inability or refusal to engage in the
political give and take required. M. L. BENEDICT, supra note 3, at 59. Benedict described the role of
the pragmatist Republicans who were essentially interested in protecting the economic interests of
northerners and freedmen from a hostile restored South rather than in restructuring the political,
social, and economic structure of the South during reconstruction. Their main method of imple-
menting this goal, therefore, was to obtain a constitutional amendment to change the basis of repre-
sentation in Congress making representation consistent with the number of voters in the South. Id.
at 136. This policy was anathema to Sumner's views on representative republicanism requiring him
to squarely confront this vehicle of implementation of the pragmatists' goals. The proposed amend-
ments would recognize the right of the South to disfranchise substantial portions of its population,




In fact, his efforts were enormously important in achieving strong public
support at critical junctures, in raising public support for the new Repub-
lican party culminating in the significant election of Lincoln in 1860,
6
and in marshalling the public behind the Republicans in the key election
of 1866 when faced with the Johnsonian program of reconstruction and a
Republican party reluctant to overstep Johnson's initiatives.65
III. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
AND THE CONSTITUTION
Sumner viewed the Declaration of Independence as a culmination of
the enunciation of the principles of revolutionary patriots who led the
American people to adopt these principles as the cause celebre of the
revolution; he viewed that same Declaration as the architect's plans for
the future government:
[i]n declaring Independence they continued loyal to their constant vows.
The natural rights of all men, and the consent of the people as the only just
foundation of government, which James Otis first announced, which Sa-
muel Adams maintained with severe simplicity, which Patrick Henry vindi-
cated even against the cry of "treason," and which had been affirned by
legislative bodies and public meetings, were embodied in the opening words
of the Declaration. There they stand, like a sublime overture to the new
Republic, interpreting, inspiring, and filling it with transforming power.
66
From the Declaration of Independence, Sumner derived that equality
was the guiding principle within which all of the other rights were em-
braced and protected.67
The overarching principle of equality was evident in the Preamble to
64. The success of Lincoln's election in 1860 must be attributed, in part at least, to the work of
those who earlier left the Whig party to form, first the Free-Soil and then the Republican party. See
C. Sumner, The Party of Freedom: Its Necessity and Practicability, Speech at the State Convention
of the Free-Soil Party of Massachusetts, Held at Lowell (Sept. 15, 1852), reprinted in III WORKS
199. Sumner viewed the Free-Soil party as an effort to reestablish the principles of human rights
evident in the Declaration of Independence and intended to be built into the foundations of the
Constitution by the framers. Id. at 204-05. C. Sumner, Duties of Massachusetts at the Present Crisis:
Formation of the Republican Party, Speech before the Republican State Convention at Worcester
(Sept. 7, 1854), reprinted in III WORKS 451. See also E. FONER, supra note 5, at 230.
65. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 115. M. Les Benedict however emphasizes the efforts of
most other Republicans in the election of 1866 to diminish the brand of radicalism and to appeal to
conservatives who might be swayed by Johnson; this included disavoing the imposition of black
suffrage. M. L. BENEDICT supa note 3, at 197-202.
66. Id. at 173.
67. Promises of the Declaration of Independence, supra note 21, at 367. See also M. WHITE,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978); G. WILLS, supra note 33.
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the Constitution, and according to Sumner provided further evidence of
the effort to solidly continue the principles of the revolutionary effort
within the framework of the Constitution. He analyzed the Preamble:
[t]hus was the National Constitution ordained, not to create an oligarchy or
aristocracy, not to exclude certain persons from the pale of its privileges,
not to organize inequality of rights in any form, but to "establish justice,"
which is Equality,-to "insure domestic tranquillity," which is vain with-
out justice,-to "provide for the common defence," which is the defence of
all,-to "promote the general welfare," which is the welfare of all,-and to
"secure the blessings of liberty" to all the people and their posterity, which
is giving to all the complete enjoyment of rights central among which is
Equality. Here, then is another authoritative definition. (emphasis in origi-
nal) 68
Sumner assumed an integration of the principles identified during
the Revolutionary War and enshrined within the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, as the common understanding of basic principles upon which the
Constitution relied. The action of subsequent generations in distorting
these underlying precepts of constitutional interpretation required a for-
malization of this integration in order to restore basic republican princi-
ples to their proper role as the foundation of the Constitution itself.
A. Integrating the Framers with Revolutionary Republicanism
Reversion to the principles enunciated in 1776 did not imply a rejec-
tion, on Sumner's part, of the importance of the Constitution and the
federal system created by that document. Sumner wholeheartedly
adopted the Constitution as an embodiment of the republican principles
he cherished.
69
He sought to integrate the thoughts, words and acts of the framers
of the Constitution with the principles identified with the development of
revolutionary republicanism emerging victorious from the war, and sur-
viving the Confederation period. His evidence persuaded him that the
framers were continuing to embue the constitutional structure of the new
government with previously identified principles.
68. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 176.
69. Unlike other radical Republicans, he never suggested a course of action in defiance of the
Constitution, at least from his view of constitutionalism. See F. BRODIE supra note 62, at 120 (for
Thaddeus Stevens' anti-constitutional proposals). Sumner could never understand Stevens' support,
in 1866, of the proposed constitutional amendment that would provide for representative apportion-
ment according to population, excluding Indians not taxed, and further providing that whenever the
elective franchise be denied or abridged in any state on account of race or color, all persons excluded
would not be counted in the basis of representation. See M. STOREY supra note 19, at 311; Equal
Rights of All, supra note 5, at 119.
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James Madison, upon the conclusion of the war, drafted the "Ad-
dress to the States for the Continental Congress," ".supplying," in Sum-
ner's view, "another definition of the new government":
Let it be remembered that it has ever been the pride and boast of America,
that the rights for which she contended were the rights of human nature. By
the blessing of the Author of those rights on the means exerted for their
defence, they have prevailed against all opposition, and form the basis of
thirteen independent States. No instance has heretofore occurred, nor can
any instance be expected hereafter to occur, in which the unadulterated
forms of Republican Government can pretend to so fair an opportunity of
justifying themselves by their fruits. In this view, the citizens of the United
States are responsible for the greatest trust ever confided to a political soci-
ety. (emphasis in original)70
And in the debates at the Philadelphia Convention, Madison recog-
nized the right of suffrage as "one of the fundamental articles of republi-
can government" warning that, "a gradual abridgment of this right has
been the mode in which aristocracies have been built on thie ruins of pop-
ular forms."7 It was significant to Sumner that Madison also depended
upon the consent of the governed as the basis of representative
government.72
Sumner characterized The Federalist No. 39 as "one of the most re-
markable chapters of the federalist" where Madison provides a definition
of a republic.
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different
forms of government are established, we may define a Republic to be, or at
least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered
by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or
during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived
from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or
a favored class of it: otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising
their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank
of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of Re-
public. (emphasis in original)
73
He drew support for his emphasis on equal representation, the vote, and
70. Id. at 174, citing JOURNAL OF CONGRESS, Apr. 26, 1783 at 201.
71. Id. at 180, citing III MADISON PAPERS 1253 (Aug. 7, 1787) (debates in the federal
convention).
72. According to Madison, "it seems indispensable that the mass of citizens should not be with-
out a voice in making the laws which they are to obey, and in choosing the magistrates who are to
administer them." Id.
73. Id. at 181, citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison).
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civil rights from the pens of other founding fathers.74 Even the "com-
promises" made by the framers of the Constitution were intended to be
strict limitations upon the growth of slavery and anticipated its early de-
mise. Nowhere in the Constitution was slavery acknowledged or sanc-
tioned by the national government .7  The insidious growth of the "slave
power" in the United States far exceeded any scrap of support gleaned
from compromises made during the framing of the Constitution. Many
expected that slavery would never be extended to new states admitted to
the union in the future, as with the Northwest Ordinance, slavery was
forever excluded from the region.76
74. From Benjamin Franklin he drew support for his emphasis on equal representation, upon
which liberty depended:
[t]hat they who have no voice nor vote in the electing of representatives do not enjoy
liberty, but are also absolutely enslaved to those who have votes, and to their representa-
tives: for to be enslaved is to have governors whom other men have set over us, and be
subject to laws made by representatives of others, without having had representatives of
our own to give consent in our behalf. (emphasis in original)
Id. at 177, citing SOME GOOD WHIG PRINCIPLES 372-73.
Jefferson continued the principles of revolutionary republicanism, which he helped to establish by
his frequent enunciation of the principles of a republic:
[t]he first principle of Republicanism is, that the lex majorispartis is the fundamental law
of every society of individuals of equal rights. To consider the will of the society
enounced by the majority of a single vote as sacred as if unanimous is the first of all
lessons in importance, yet the last which is thoroughly learnt. This law once disregarded,
no other remains but that of force, which ends necessarily in military despotism. (em-
phasis in original)
Id. at 178, citing VII WRmNGS 75.
Hamilton too, according to Sumner, in THE FEDERALIST No. 54, which he attributed to him,
contributed to the linkage to revolutionary principles:
It is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of
property, that a place is denied to them in the computation of numbers; AND IT IS AD-
MITTED, THAT, IF THE LAWS WERE TO RESTORE THE RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BEEN
TAKEN AWAY, THE NEGROES COULD NO LONGER BE REFUSED AN EQUAL SHARE OF
REPRESENTATION WITH THE OTHER INHABITANTS. (emphasis in original)
Id at 184, citing THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (A. Hamilton).
75. In 1847, Sumner was not yet willing to admit that the national government had any power
to interfere with the state government's recognition of slavery within their own state; however, he
was adamant about obliterating the federal government's support of slavery in any form:
It is not proposed to interfere with Slavery in any constitutional stronghold, or to touch
any so-called compromise of the Constitution. Adopting the principle, so often declared
by our Southern friends, that Slavery is a local institution, drawing its vitality from the
municipal laws of the states in which it exists, we solemnly assert that the power of the
Nation, of Congress, of the North as well as the South, shall not be employed for its
extension, and that this curse shall not be planted in any territory hereafter acquired.
C. Sumner, Necessity of Political Action Against the Slave Power and the Extension of Slavery,
Speech in the Whig State Convention of Massachusetts, Springfield (Sept. 29, 1847), reprinted in II
WORKS at 56-7 [hereinafter Political Action Against the Slave Power].
76. "The early conduct of our fathers, at the formation of the Constitution," according to Sum.
REPUBLICAN REVIVAL
The rising influence of this distortion of what the framers of the
Constitution had intended enraged Sumner.
With every new extension of Slavery, fresh strength is imparted to that
political influence, monstrous offspring of Slavery, known as Slave Power.
This influence, beyond any other under our government has deranged our
institutions. To it the greater evils which have afflicted the country, the
different perils to the Constitution, may all be traced. The Missouri Com-
promise, the annexation of Texas, the war with Mexico, are only specimens
of trouble from the Slave Power ... The Slave Power is the imprisoned giant
of our Constitution. It is there confined and bound. But its constant and
strenuous struggles have caused, and ever will cause, eruptions of evil, in
comparison with which flames, red-hot cinders, and fiery lava are trivial
and transitory. (emphasis added)
77
When compromises were suggested to ward off armed conflict be-
tween the rebel governments and the union, Sumner adamantly fought
potential amendments which would have recognized slave holding inter-
ests. 78 He continually emphasized the limitations which were intended by
the framers despite any compromises they may have made. While the
framers grudgingly permitted slavery to exist by not expressly forbidding
it, and by other compromises made in the Constitution, it was always
with a view toward eventual abolition of slavery, never with a view to-
ward its extension. The Constitution, therefore, was imbued with an in-
herent commitment toward constraining slavery, and as early as possible,
eliminating all vestiges of its existence. While the founding fathers con-
trolled the future of the country, this constitutional view held firm; how-
ever, after their influence waned, others attempted, according to Sumner,
to corrupt this constitutional premise with efforts to extend the govern-
ment's involvement and approval of slavery and the interests of slave
power. This was a direct affront to the interpretation of the Constitution
held by the framers and legitimized by the principles of the Declaration
of Independence and revolutionary republicanism. Thus, Sumner viewed
the Missouri Compromise, the annexation of Texas, the war with Mex-
ico, and the Fugitive Slave Acts, and other acts, as efforts to extend this
corruption of constitutional interpretation precipitating the crisis which
necessitated formalization of the synthesis between revolutionary repub-
licanism, including principles of the Declaration of Independence, and
ner, "should be our guide now." Id. at 58. "On the original suggestion of Jefferson, subsequently
sustained and modified by others, a clause was introduced into the fundamental law of the North-
west Territory by which slavery has been forever excluded from that extensive region." Id.
77. Id. at 59-60.
78. He asserted that, "[i]gnoble will it be in us to concede beyond the Constitution, which em-




The acute task facing Republicans at the close of the Civil War, in
Sumner's opinion, was to seize the moment to resolve the inconsistencies
and unfinished work of the founders. The ratification of the Constitution
did not complete the business of shaping its parameters or "creating a
nation."80 The pragmatic necessity of creating a union led them to stave
off divisive issues for resolution by future generations working within the
spirit of the Constitution. For Sumner, the failure of the founding fram-
ers to resolve finally the issue of slavery did not represent a "question of
intellectual discontinuity ' 81 between the framers' Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence, but merely temporary resort to pragma-
tism. Just as he rejected the politician's inherent bent toward political
survival as a legitimate inhibitor of the moral compulsion to provide full
social, political and economic equality for black citizens as part of his
reconstruction proposals, he refused to recognize any pragmatic compro-
mise made during the constitutional founding as annihilating the under-
lying constitutional commitment to equality of rights.82 The crisis
represented by the war demanded a resolution of those constitutional
ambiguities with respect to underlying principles; Sumner sought to re-
solve those ambiguities not with radical new proposals, but with solid
applications from principles of the past.
79. Union Against the Slave Power, supra note 20, at 79. To Sumner the framers' intentions
were clear:
It is plain that our Constitution was formed by lovers of Human Freedom,-that it was
animated by their divine spirit,-that Slavery was regarded by them with aversion, so
that, if covertly alluded to, it was not named in the instrument,-and that they all looked
forward to an early day when this evil and shame would be obliterated from the land.
Surely, then, it is right to say that the combination which seeks to perpetuate and extend
Slavery is unknown to the Constitution,-that it exists in defiance of that instrument,
and also of the recorded opinions uttered constantly by its founders.
Id. at 79. See generally C. Sumner, The Wrong of Slavery, Speech at a Public Meeting in Faneuil
Hall, Boston, against the Admission of Texas as a Slave State (Nov. 4, 1846), reprinted in I WORKS
149-60; Wrongful Declaration of War Against Mexico, Letter to Hon. Robert C. Winthrop, Repre-
sentative in Congress from Boston (Oct. 25, 1846), reprinted in I WORKS 317-30; C. Sumner, Slavery
and the Mexican War, Speech at a Public Meeting in the Tremont Temple, Boston (Nov. 5, 1846),
reprinted in I WORKS 333-51; Political Action Against the Slave Power, supra note 75, at 55.
80. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR 6 (1981).
81. M. WHITE, PHILOSQPHY, THE FEDERALIST AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987). White sees
philosophical similarities between the two documents. He specifically rejects Gordon Wood's view
that "the whole intellectual world of 1776 had become unravelled by 1787." Id at 208.
82. William Nelson suggests that the "framing generation understood constitutional politics as a
rhetorical venture designed to persuade people to do good, rather than a bureaucratic venture in-
tended to establish precise legal rules and enforcement mechanisms." W. NELSON, supra note 7, at 9.
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B. The Constitution as an Embodiment of the Spirit of Republicanism
Revolutionary republicans viewed constitution making as an at-
tempt to capture the spirit of purpose for which the government was
created. Although they wanted protections delineated wherever possible,
and were among later antifederalists who fought vehemently for a bill of
rights, they realized that no document could capture the precise defini-
tion of all rights and responsibilities encompassed in a republican society.
While they recoiled from the idea of mimicking the British constitutional
system, their expectation of the force of a written document incorporated
the surrounding ideals and rights which emerged from their view of soci-
ety. The Constitution was a tool toward achieving the articulated virtue
of the society; the very nature of what they believed a society should be
was woven into the fabric of their expectation of a constitution.83
Sumner adopted their view of a constitution; it spurred his convic-
tion that the principles of the Declaration of Independence and his un-
derstanding of the principles of a republican society were embedded in
any interpretation of the Constitution.84
83. In a recent article, Paul Kahn argues that methods of constitutional interpretation were
transformed by ensuing generations. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins ofnAmerican Constitution-
alism, 98 YALE L. J. 449 (1989). The founding generation, according to Kahn, based their constitu-
tional interpretations on "reason," which included reference to political science and theory. Id. Later
generations relied not on reason but on an understanding that the Constitution was created as as act
of "will," thus requiring reference to the intent of the constitutional creators. Id. While he does not
separate out early Republicans from early pluralists, his observations help to explain the willingness
of early Republicans to expect a more comprehensive interpretation of their future Constitution.
The late Robert Cover's discussion of the role of natural law in the interpretation of a written
constitution is also illuminating; many of the revolutionary republicans (James Otis, for example),
imposed natural law readings upon positive law itself. However, according to Cover, as the Republi-
cans moved farther away from an acceptance of natural law principles as a common source for
constitutional principle, they continued to believe in "a natural law generated by the United States
Constitution." R. COVER, supra note 13.
See also Ackerman, supra note 1, for a discussion of the importance of a written constitution and
the implications of the British tradition on the American experience. M. WHITE, supra note 67, also
emphasizes the importance of the American view of inherent assumptions about the protection of
natural rights embedded within the people's understanding of their new constitution. See also
Tushnet, infra note 90. Sumner believed that the framers' included within the Constitution's message
inherent boundries limiting the extension of slavery, providing the seeds of its elimination; any exten-
sion of slavery, conflicted with the moral framework of constitutional foundations. Equal Rights of
All, supra note 5, at 59-60.
84. Equal Rights of All, supra note 5, at 194-95. According to Sumner:
[w]e have seen these principles adopted as the very frontlet of the Republic, when it
assumed its place in the family of nations, and then again when it ordained its Constitu-
tion; we have seen them avowed and illustrated in memorable words by the greatest
authorities of our history; lastly, we have seen them embodied in public acts of the States
collectively and individually; and now, out of this concurring, cumulative, and unim-
peachable testimony, constituting a speaking aggregation absolutely without precedent, I
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C. Implementing Republicanism Prior to the Civil War
Sumner's commitment to federalism surfaced repeatedly prior to the
onset of the Civil War in his reluctance to assert congressional power
over the internal affairs of a state. All of his energies focused on the ne-
cessity for abolishing any support for slavery by the national govern-
ment, and on launching a vehement campaign against the admission of
new slave states. Sumner believed that the admission of new slave states
contributed to the insidious growth of the distortion of representation in
the United States Congress in favor of the slave power and against the
very limitations imposed by the framers in the Constitution, as evidenced
by their other public and private actions.
Sumner argued that the only conceivable support for slavery was
through 'positive law" within the states." Nothing in the Constitution or
structure of the federal government supported slavery, so that encroach-
ments on this notion leading toward an interpretation of the Constitution
as a source of support of slavery, represented a dangerous distortion of
the Constitution itself, the intent of the framers and the principles of
republicanism. The Missouri Compromise, the annexation of Texas, the
war with Mexico, which he claimed was begun by "the slave power inter-
ests," and the Fugitive Slave Laws, represented a growing crisis in the
interpretation of the Constitution.
True representative government, mandated by the incorporation of
principles of revolutionary republicanism, depended upon the establish-
ment of liberty, equality and the consent of the governed. In the name of
"liberty," prior to the outbreak of Civil War, he advocated the disavow-
ment of federal government support of slavery in any form; he protested
vehemently against the Fugitive Slave Laws, he protested the admission
of additional slave states, and he supported emancipation in the territo-
ries and the District of Columbia. After the outbreak of war, he advo-
offer you the American definition of a Republican form of government.. .the early and
constant postulates of the Fathers, the corporate declarations of the Fathers, the avowed
opinions of the Fathers, and the public acts of the Fathers,. . all with one voice pro-
claiming, first, that all men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that government derives its
just powers from the consent of the governed; and here is the American idea of a Repub-
lic, which must be adopted in the interpretation of the National Constitution. You can-
not reject it.
Id. at 195-96.
85. See discussion of Robert Cover for one view of the role of positive law and slavery in pre-
revolutionary America. R. COVER, supra note 13, at 25-28. C. Sumner, Freedom National, Slavery
Sectional, Speech in the Senate, on a Motion to Repeal the Fugitive Slave Act (Aug. 26, 1852),
reprinted in III WORKS 105. [hereinafter Freedom National].
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cated the emancipation of slaves everywhere.8 6
In the name of "equality" he argued vociferously in Massachusetts
for admission of colored students to white schools, for participation of
blacks as witnesses and jurors, against segregation on public transporta-
tion in the District of Columbia, for equal representation in state legisla-
tive apportionment, and against admission of slave holding states in the
distortion of equal representation of citizens.8 7 His strong support for the
Constitution and for federalism explained his initial focus on attacking
slavery where it was supported by the national government; he recog-
nized the inability of Congress to legislate over the internal affairs of the
slave holding states.
In his first major speech as a Senator, "Freedom National, Slavery
Sectional," he protested the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Laws of
1793 and 1850, since the institution of slavery was not supported by the
Constitution and could only be supported by positive law in the state
itself.88 Involvement of the federal government in the enforcement of fu-
gitive slave laws contorted constitutional principles to favor slavery when
the principle founders were anti-slavery and had no intention of preserv-
86. C. Sumner, Rights of Sovereignty and Rights of War: Two Sources of Power Against the
Rebellion, Speech in the Senate, on his Bill for the Confiscation of Property and the Liberation of
Slaves Belonging to the Rebels (May 19, 1862), reprinted in VII WORKS 1. [hereinafter Rights of
Sovereignty].
87. In December, 1865, for example, Sumner introduced resolutions calling for equal suffrage in
the District of Columbia, allowance for the presence of Negro jurors where the rights of Negroes
were involved. See, e.g., C. Sumner, Opening of the United States Courts to Colored Witnesses,
Speech in the Senate on an Amendment to the Civil Appropriation Bill (June 25, 1864), reprinted in
IX WORKS 39; C. Sumner, Admission of a Colored Lawyer to the Bar of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Motion in the Supreme Court (Feb. 1, 1865), reprinted in IX WORKS 229; C. Sumner,
No Reconstruction Without the Votes of Blacks, Remarks in the Senate, on the Resolution Recog-
nizing the New State Government of Louisiana (Feb. 24, 25, & 27, 1865), reprinted in IX WORKS
311; Impartial Jurors for Colored Persons, Bill in the Senate (Dec. 4, 1865), reprinted in X WORKS
10; Colored Suffrage in the District of Columbia, Bill in the Senate (Dec. 4, 1865), reprinted in X
WORKS 5; C. Sumner, Free Schools and Free Books, Remarks in the Senate, on an Amendment to
the Internal Revenue Act, Making Books free (Feb. 27, 1865), repinted in IX WORKS 336; C. Sum-
ner, Equal Rights of Colored Persons to be Protected by the National Courts, Bill in the Senate, to
enforce the Constitutional Amendment abolishing Slavery (Dec. 4, 1865), reprinted in X WORKS 16;
C. Sumner, Political Equality Without Distinction of Color, No Compromise of Human Rights,
Second Speech in the Senate on the proposed Amendment of the Constitution fixing thd Basis of
Representation (Mar. 7, 1866), repinted in X WORKS 282; C. Sumner, Equal Rights a Condition of
Reconstruction, Amendment in the Senate to a Reconstruction Bill (May 29, 1866), reprinted in X
WORKS 464; C. Sumner, No More States with the Word "White" in the Constitution, Speeches in
the Senate on the Admission of Nebraska as a State (July 27, Dec. 14, 19, 1866-Jan. 8, 1867),
reprinted in X WORKS 504.
88. Freedom National, supra note 85, at 105.
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ing it in the Constitution.89
D. Equality of Education
Sumner oriented himself within the tradition of revolutionary re-
publicanism as it evolved from the colonial experience of community and
independence, to the radical patriots.9" He not only borrowed the ideas
espoused by individual radical patriots, he attempted to infuse his world
view with a revolutionary republican orientation.
It is no accident that he was drawn early in his career to fight for
equal public education for all. While the liberal Lockean influence per-
vaded the relations between individual and government in the world sur-
rounding Sumner, the republican emphasis on the importance of
education in the creation of civic virtue permeated the blossoming insti-
tution of public education.91
89. Id. at 105-118.
90. See, Tushnet, supra note 17 (questioning whether many people after the foundation viewed
themselves as orienting themselves to republicanism as a tradition). He defines tradition as "different
from a complex of ideas that can be precisely identified as being in existence during any particular
period." He suggests,
that traditions consist of the relations among complexes of ideas. That is, at one point
people characterize their beliefs-the complex of ideas they hold-as a coherent whole.
When those beliefs become a tradition, the coherence of the whole may dissolve. Succes-
sors orient themselves to the tradition by identifying some elements in their predeces-
sors' thought to which they continue to adhere and disregarding or explaining away
other elements in that thought which they feel compelled to reject.
Id. at 93-4. Certainly Sumner attempted to locate himself within this tradition as he defined it.
91. See Baker, From Belief into Culture: Republicanism in the Antebellum North 37 AM. Q. 532
(1985) (emphasizing the importance of republicanism in the institution of public schools and polit-
ical parties). Baker states:
[t]hus while the spirit of Locke was transforming individual Americans into incipient
entrepreneurs, the alternative faith, the republican sense of civic virtue and commu-
nity-fostered what soon became the most important public institution for training
Americans. Schooling emerged as the taproot of a uniform republican culture, and the
felt need for civic instruction sparked an enduring national commitment to education,
not for its liberating benefits or as economic training within a modernizing economy, but
as a political tool training Americans in the eighteenth century understanding of civic
virtue.
Id. at 539-40. Late in his career, Sumner was still advocating the importance of education for repub-
lican institutions:
In a republic education is indispensable. A republic without education is like the crea-
ture of imagination, a human being without a soul, living and moving blindly, with no
just sense of the present or the future. It is a monster. Such have been the Rebel States,-
for years nothing less than political monsters. But such they must be no longer.
C. Sumner, Reconstruction Again, The Ballot and Public Schools Open to All, Speeches in the
Senate on the Supplementary Reconstruction Bill (Mar. 15-16, 1867), reprinted in XI WORKS 156
[hereinafter Reconstruction Again], And again, in seeking guaranties for the success of
reconstruction:
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Early in his career, in 1849, Sumner argued for equal education
rights for colored persons in Massachusetts.9" Education was a key ele-
ment in providing for equality as well as for meaningful participation in
government. Sumner's views on the need for education to ensure proper
virtues could have been lifted straight from the pens of earlier revolution-
ary patriots:
[w]ithout knowledge there can be no sure Progress. Vice and barbarism are
the inseparable companions of ignorance. Nor is it too much to say, that,
except in rare instances, the highest virtue is attained only through intelli-
gence. This is natural, for to do right, we must first understand what is
right.
93
Sumner emphasized the classroom as a microcosm stimulating the
growth of future citizens, imparting essential values for good govern-
ment; he insisted that separate but equal schools could not accomplish
this goal:
[t]he school is the little world where the child is trained for the larger world
of life. It is the microcosm preparatory to the macrocosm, and therefore it
must cherish and develop the virtues and the sympathies needed in the
larger world. And since, according to our institutions, all classes, without
distinction of color, meet in the performance of civil duties, so should they
all, without distinction of color, meet in the school, beginning there those
relations of Equality which the Constitution [of Massachusetts] and Laws
promise to all.
As the State derives strength from the unity and solidarity of its citi-
zens without distinction of class, so the school derives strength from the
unity and solidarity of all classes beneath its roof.
9 4
Sixteen years later, in a speech on reconstruction, Sumner elabo-
rated on the importance of education:
[then, again, education: who can doubt? Certainly not my friend from Oregon: he will
not doubt the importance of education as a corner-stone of Reconstruction. It is a golden
moment. We have the power. Let us not fail to exercise it. Exercising it now, we can
shape the destinies of that people for the future.
C. Sumner, Further Guaranties in Reconstruction: Loyalty, Education, and a Homestead for Freed-
men; Measures of Reconstruction Not a Burden or Penalty, Resolutions and Speeches in the Senate
(Mar. 7, 11, 1867), reprinted in XI WORKS 130.
92. C. Sumner, Equality Before the Law: Unconstitutionality of Separate Colored Schools in
Massachusetts, Argument before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of Sarah C. Rob-
erts vs. City of Boston (Dec. 4, 1849), reprinted in II WORKS 327 [hereinafter Equality Before the
Law]. For a brief discussion of this case see, Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebel-
lum Era, 32 AMER. J.L. HIsT. 325 (1988).
93. Law of Human Progress, supra note 22, at 117; C. Sumner, Equal Rights to the Lecture-
Room, Letter to the Committee of the New Bedford Lyceum (Nov. 29, 1845), reprinted in I WORKS
160.
94. Equality Before the Law, supra note 92, at 371-72.
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[a]s the education of the people is essential to the national welfare, and espe-
cially to the development of those principles of justice and morality which
constitutes the only sure foundation of a Republican Government and as,
according to the Census, an immense population of the People of the Rebel
States, without distinction of color, cannot read or write, it is obvious that
public schools must be established for the equal good of all. The example of
Massachusetts must be followed, which, after declaring in its Constitution
that "wisdom and knowledge as well as virtue, diffused generally among the
body of the people, are necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties," proceeds to direct the Legislature and magistrates, in all future
periods, "to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences," and espe-
cially "public and grammar schools in the towns." All this must enter our
work of reconstruction, and become one of our guaranties. (emphasis in
original)
95
By 1867 when the Senate was reluctantly supporting universal suf-
frage in the reconstruction bills, Sumner argued that the measures were
'horribly defective,' because they made no provision for education in the
south and set up no agency by which 'the freedmen can be secured a
freehold for themselves and their families.' "96
IV. REVOLUTIONARY REPUBLICANISM AS THE ANIMATING FORCE
BEHIND SUMNER'S PLANS FOR RECONSTRUCTION
Although Sumner recognized the conflict over reconstruction in
part to stem from the struggle for power between the executive and legis-
lative branches of government, and between the state and federal govern-
ments, he also conceptualized it as a struggle over the implementation of
genuine republican conditions in the South. Republicanism fueled the de-
bate for all three struggles. Sumner's adherence to his theory of republi-
canism made it impossible for him to compromise his position because
each of these battles dealt with substantive issues essential to the survival
of republican government as he understood it.
Sumner's theory of vacated governments made it possible for him to
mesh his strong belief in federalism with the right of the national govern-
ment, and in particular the Congress, to impose conditions which would
allow the full citizenry of each southern state to participate in creating a
legitimate republican form of government. His fear of the military and
his belief in the consent of the governed as the only legitimate origin of
government forced him to oppose presidential reconstruction plans
where the source of the new governments flowed from military imposi-
95. National Security and National Faith, supra note 9, at 460.
96. See RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 4, at 287.
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tion of civilian government. His substantive understanding of the condi-
tions essential to a true republican form of government forced him to
hold out against compromises proposed by others in Congress where
such compromises failed to give a voice to the newly freed citizens in
reconstituting their governments, and where such proposals failed to pro-
vide the mechanisms to make the franchise and participation in govern-
ment meaningful.
A. Justifying Federal Intervention
Although southerners, particularly in the early antebellum period,
used republican arguments to justify slavery, emphasizing the impor-
tance of local control and fear of governmental interference with the Jef-
fersonian ideal of the yeoman farmer, the emphasis shifted to liberalist
arguments by the 1850s.97
Once the southern states attempted to secede from the union, Sum-
ner adopted the stance that governments loyal to the union, government
officials who had sworn to uphold the Constitution had "vacated" their
offices, abandoned their laws, leaving a void for Congress to fl.98 The
people, according to Sumner's view of republicanism, were entitled to a
loyal government chosen by those to be governed. When the existing gov-
ernmental officials chose to ignore their responsibilities to their oath to
support the Constitution, they reneged on their commitment to the peo-
ple; once slaves were liberated by emancipation, Sumner was also faced
with a huge unrepresented population not previously recognized within
the state and now entitled to choose their representative government.
In 1862 Sumner suggested that under the rights of sovereignty, the
national government was obligated to act to protect the loyal citizens of
the southern states and to restore republican government against either
"criminals" or "enemies of the national government":
The old State Governments, solemnly bound by the oaths of their function-
aries to support the National Constitution, have vanished; and in their place
appear pretended Governments, which adopting the further pretension of a
Confederacy, have proceeded to issue letters of marque and to levy war
against the United States.... In point of fact, throughout this territory the
National Government is ousted, while the old State Governments have
97. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 92; Oakes, From Republicanism to Liberalism: Ideological
Change and the Crisis of the Old South 37 AM. Q. 551 (1985). Oakes indicates, however, that these
ideas gave way by the 1850's to a Madisonian "proto-liberalism" which would shape the ideology of
the slave holding class in the antebellum south." Id. at 554.
98. C. Sumner, State Rebellion, State Suicide: Emancipation and Reconstruction, Resolution in
the Senate (Feb. 11, 1862), reprinted in VI WORKs 301.
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ceased to exist, lifeless now from Rebel hands. Call it suicide, if you will, or
suspended animation or abeyance,-they have practically ceased to exist.99
To Sumner, what served as justification for the federal government
to legislate, once the existing government was abandoned, was the need
for the creation of conditions where the people could begin to create their
representative government.
The "state" still existed, secession being impossible in Sumner's
view; however,
it became the duty of the national authority to set up loyal governments,
and at the same time to say that they were republican in form,-which
must mean at least that they are governments of the majority, and not of
the minority; and I think I cannot err, if I add, that, according to the funda-
mental principles of the Declaration of Independence, they must be
founded on the equal rights of all men and "the consent of thegoverned." 1oo
Four alternative constitutional sources were suggested by Sumner as
authority for the Federal government to oversee reconstruction of the
southern state governments after the war: military authority under arti-
cle two of the Constitution until security was restored after the war; con-
gressional authority under the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution,
federal authority under the Territories Clause; and authority under the
Declaration of Independence after the Civil War, since the integration of
the Declaration of Independence with the Constitution had been formal-
ized in the North's victory. 101
99. Rights of Sovereignty, supra note 86, at 14.
100. National Security and National Faith, supra note 95, at 463-64.
101. Id. at 464-65. See W. WIECEK, supra note 18 (for a discussion of President Johnson's use of
the Guarantee Clause in his proclamations appointing the provisional governors for the occupied
states). Wieeek asserts that Johnson's theory was that the President could enforce the Guarantee
Clause without congressional authorization. "[li]t operated automatically once the states had
presented republican constitutions; and the federal government was obliged to render the guarantee.
Johnson's assumptions not only clashed head on with the republicans, but also swept under the rug
all important questions implicit in the clause." Id. at 189-90. According to Wiecek, "Sumner took
out the most radical part of the territoriality theory-which was that the states were out of the
union. His argument appealed to other proponents of the guaranty clause because they could now
plausibly argue that states were in the union." Id. at 176. Because of this theory, Sumner submitted a
resolution during the first session, on February 18, 1865, which omitted the 'seceded states' from the
count when determining the number of states necessary for ratification of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. C. Sumner, Participation of Rebel States Not Necessary in Ratification of




B. The Origin of Newly Constituted Governments
Sumner's theories rationalizing future reconstruction efforts by Con-
gress were inextricably intertwined with a deep commitment to his form
of republicanism. Fear of the encroachment of military power upon the
consent of the governed for the type of representative government cre-
ated, equality of representation, equality of civil, political and social
rights, in the context of a strong federal government operating within the
boundaries of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence,
often forced Sumner to publicly attack both Lincoln's and Johnson's re-
construction plans as well as oppose his Senate colleagues in the meas-
ures they chose for reconstruction.
Military occupation after the war received almost unanimous sup-
port from the Republicans in Congress. Sumner recognized the necessity
for security purposes, to "hold military possession of the rebel states for
as long as required for security,-whether months, or years." The na-
tional government also retained the power to set the terms of peace and
restoration. 10 2 6
This power justified the President's action in placing military gover-
nors in charge of the southern states after the war; thus, Sumner had no
difficulty with President Lincoln's initial plans for reconstruction. When,
however, Lincoln went beyond merely "securing the territory," by al-
lowing the military governor to recognize a completely disloyal govern-
ment, which failed to provide proper representation for its newly freed
slaves, Sumner insisted the President had overstepped his constitutional
authority. Similarly, when Johnson appointed civilian governors, or com-
missioners, Sumner viewed him as exceeding his powers as commander-
in-chief and attempting to usurp legislative functions.
10 3
Sumner saw the exercise of presidential power in early reconstruc-
tion as military in character, and thus, dangerous and temporary in na-
ture. Certainly the military government was limited in its ability to
restructure republican governments. No true republican government
could be military in its origins. 1" "Clearly," he admonished his col-
102. The National Security and the National Faith, supra note 95.
103. C. Sumner, The One Man Power vs. Congress, The Present Situation, Address at the
Opening of the Annual Lectures of the Parker Fraternity at the Music Hall, Boston (Oct. 2, 1866),
reprinted in XI WORKS 3 [hereinafter One Man Power vs. Congress]; C. Sumner, Protection Against
the President, Speeches in the Senate, on an Amendment to the Tenure of Office Bill (Jan. 15, 17, 18,
1867), reprinted in XI WORKS 59.
104. Reconstruction Again, supra note 91, at 162-63. Sumner added that,
[i]mbued with this principle, I hoped that Congress would see the way to establish at
once civil governments in all those States, and not subject them to military power, except
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leagues in the Senate, "it is according to the genius of republican institu-
tions that the military should be subordinate to the civil. Cedant arma
togae is an approved maxim, not to be disregarded with impunity." 05No
military government could create the consent of the governed necessary
for a true republican government. Its usefulness immediately after the
war and during the recalcitrant bloodletting of the postwar era was to
provide protection to the loyal citizens within the southern states. Condi-
tions would then become favorable for citizens to convene their own con-
ventions where the majority of loyal citizens of all races could create
their own civil government. But, warned Sumner, "it is one thing to gov-
ern a state temporarily by military power, and quite another to create a
constitution for a State which shall continue when the military power has
expired. (emphasis in original)
10 6
In response to Lincoln's extension of presidential authority beyond
occupation, to establishing the civilian government without prior con-
gressional approval, Sumner asserted his conviction, rooted in revolu-
tionary republicanism, that the origin of government could not derive
from HAlitary occupation. Lincoln recognized the dangers to unstable
provincial governments in the critical aftermath of Civil War; he acted to
protect the fragile efforts at reconstructing the southern governments by
bolstering their stability with military support, noting that, "we shall
sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it." Sumner
replied, however, "[t]he eggs of the crocodiles can produce only croco-
diles; and it is not easy to see how eggs laid by military power can be
hatched in an American state."'1 7 Allowing the military to create the
source of government would defeat every notion of republicanism Sum-
ner so vigorously supported.
When the Committee on the Judiciary introduced a resolution on
February 18, 1865 recognizing the reconstituted antebellum government
of Louisiana, set in place after the internal struggle resulting in the ouster
so far as needed for purposes of protection. This is the true object of the army. It is to
protect the country,-not to make constitutions, or to superintend the making of consti-
tutions. At least, so I have read the history of republican institutions, and such are the
aspirations that I presume to express for my country.
Id. For a republican view of the role of the military, see Cress, Republican Liberty and National
Security: American Military Policy as as Ideological Problem 1783-1784, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 73
(1981).
105. Id. at 146-47.
106. One Man Power vs. Congress, supra note 103, at 10.
107. RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 5, at 206-07, citing VIII LINCOLN'S WORKS 604; C. Sumner,




of Lincoln's military governor General Banks in favor of antebellum gov-
ernment sympathizers, Sumner vigorously opposed the resolution, claim-
ing that the government was "not republican in origin or form" and
provided "no security for the rights of colored persons." ' A substitute
was proposed on February 23, which declared that:
neither the people nor the legislature of any seceded state 0 9 should elect
Senators or Representatives in Congress, until the President should declare
by proclamation that armed hostility to government has ceased therein, nor
until people had adopted a constitution in harmony with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and Congress had by law declared the state
entitled to representation."' 0
And Sumner offered his own amendment which provided that the
recognition should not take effect "except upon the fundamental condi-
tion that within the state there shall be no denial of the electoral
franchise or any other rights, on account of color or race, but all persons
shall be equal before the law." ' Both substitute and amendment were
defeated.112 In the same session, Sumner introduced a resolution recog-
nizing the obligation of the federal government:
[t]o reestablish republican governments in states whose governments had
been vacated, that governments to be republican, must rest on the consent
of the governed and that all persons must be equal before the law; that no
government founded on military power or having its origin in military or-
ders could be republican.
113
Sumner's deep anti-militarism and concerns for the origin of government
were also integral to his theory of republicanism. He noted repeatedly the
dangers of military power in a republic, citing the founding patriots. His
own career had commenced with a sensational speech against wars and
the dangers of militarism to republican governments. 14
If Lincoln's plan had employed military powers in an effort to en-
sure that the majority of all the people of the state were able to partici-
pate in reconstructing their constitution and government, Sumner would
108. C. Sumner, Guaranty of Republican Governments in the Rebel States, Resolutions in the
Senate (Feb. 25, 1865), reprinted in IX WORKs 329-332.
109. Although Sumner referred to the "seceded states" he used this as a matter of convenience;
he never recognized the right of the states to secede and usually meant an attempt to secede when he
referred to the seceded states. See discussion infra at 501.
110. 38 CONG. GLOBE 1011 (1865) (special session) This occurred at a special session of the
Congress which commenced immediately following the conclusion of the second session.
111. Id. at 1099.
112. Id. at 1011.
113. Id. at 1091.
114. Grandeur of Nations, supra note 60.
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have enthusiastically supported the President (as he had done when the
President first announced his plan in December, 1863).115 However, use
of the military to obstruct the power of the majority of the people to
reconstitute their government, and the refusal to create an environment
where the newly freed slaves could receive information, government par-
ticipation and the vote, created just the type of structure the founders
had feared-an aristocratic elite, shored by military power. This truly
could not be recognized as achieving the consent of the governed under
any definition Sumner could abide.
David Donald suggests that Sumner, influenced by "the broadly na-
tionalistic school of Joseph Story and John Quincy Adams. . .did not
specially venerate the principle of separation of powers. What he wanted
was results."' 1 6 Although he did not venerate separation of powers as
anything more than a vehicle for implementing the foundational princi-
ples of republicanism-here he could accept presidential authority to act
in the South under military powers if the actions were geared toward
creating an environment where the consent of the governed could be
achieved, rather than the military government becoming the source of
the civilian government. It was a critical distinction for Sumner, provid-
ing justification for his later acceptance of the military reconstruction
acts, as a vehicle toward accomplishing that goal.'
1 7
Conservative Republicans could only justify reconstruction pro-
grams if they believed that the normal federal relations had resumed be-
tween the southern states and the national government; they were
reluctant to abandon support for President Johnson's reconstruction
115. See RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 5, at 152. According to one scholar, Lincoln's version of
republicanism was really liberalism based on Locke's "abstract conception of a state of nature where
men retained, after their needful creation of government, certain rights and privileges." This was
bolstered by a Jeffersonian conviction that "citizens must be freed from governmental intrusions and
favoritism to elites for equal opportunities in the marketplace and at the polling place." Baker, supra
note 91. Baker asserts that,
[n]ever did his [Lincoln's] version of life, liberty and happiness include the equality of
making "black women our wives" (as he put it), nor did he intend to abolish slavery
where it existed. Lincoln meant only to end slavery someday, somehow, and to keep the
peculiar institution out of any new territories.... Here, rewritten for his generation was
the Jeffersonian vision of a society of independent white men prospering without the
intrusion of the government-protected institution of slavery .... Thus nearly a century
after the American Revolution the propulsive logic of natural rights individualism had
produced Lincoln's theoretical anti-slaveryism....
Id. at 533.
116. RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 5, at 62. See supra note 59, for further discussion of the
influence of Justice Joseph Story.
117. 39 CONG. GLOBE 1976 (1867).
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plans pursuant to his authority as commander-in-chief; the closer the
proximity to a "state of war" justification for extraordinary action, the
more comfortable their support. However, when it became apparent that
Johnson's plan meant virtual restoration of pre-Civil War governments
(by his veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act), the
conservatives moved closer to Sumner's theories.,18 Once superficial
stages of reconstruction were initiated, and after the passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment, these conservatives again became uneasy about the
constitutional justifications as federal-state relations became, on the sur-
face, at least, more normal.1 9 This conservatism would push them to
support reconstruction proposals, as late as 1867, to require that 50 per-
cent of the registered voters participate in the elections which ratified the
new state constitutions, before the state could be recognized, an effort to
delay the resumption of normal federal state relations. Sumner, by con-
trast, driven by his view of republicanism, aimed at achieving the consent
of the governed, and searched for an assurance that a minority of the
voters did not control the ratification of their constitution.
1 20
C. The True Conditions of Equality
Sumner's inability to support Lincoln's plan stemmed from his revo-
lutionary view of equality-which meant more than mere freedom-and
required full integration of citizens into the rights and responsibilities of
that citizenship. All of his actions aimed at accomplishing the full mean-
ing of republican citizenship for all members of the community. Whereas
Lincoln, and even more flagrantly, Johnson,1 21 never shared his view of
republican citizenship applying to the newly freed slaves: the politics and
118. Id. at 915-17; Id. at 1785.
119. M. L. BENEDICT supra note 3, at 315-16.
120. This was consistent with his belief that the federal government, by Congress, had the
power to determine who should participate and fix the suffrage in adopting a new state constitution.
See id. at 32.
121. Sumner commented on Andrew Johnson's early views on equality; when speaking in the
Senate he quotes the Declaration of Independence and then states:
[i]s there an intelligent man throughout the whole country.. .is there a Senator, when he
stripped himself of all party prejudice, who will come forward and say that he believes
that Mr. Jefferson, when he penned that paragraph of the Declaration of Independence,
intended it to embrace the African population? Is there a gentleman in the Senate who
believes such a thing?. . .There is not a man of respectable intelligence who will hazard
his reputation upon such an assertion.
Equality Before the Law, supra note 92, at 332, citing 36 CONG. GLOBE 100 (Dec. 12, 1859) It is
clear that Johnson feared the Negro vote. He worried that late slaveholders would control Negroes
granted suffrage and use that vote against the poorer whites in the south. L. Cox & J. Cox, supra
note 4, at 154.
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the economics militated against their embracement of a truly republican
approach to the problem. Johnson claimed that allowing the white voters
the right to decide whether Negroes could vote was demanded by the
concept of "the right of the people to govern themselves."' 22
Concern for equality of representation and against "virtual represen-
tation" were exacerbated by the distortion of representation proposed by
the newly reconstituted state plans receiving presidential approval after
the war. Sumner, in his "Equal Rights for All" speech in the Senate in
1865, introduced lengthy population tables based on the 1860 census to
demonstrate to his colleagues, but more importantly to the public, the
impossibility of truly representative government where in some cases,
over half of the population consisted of unrepresented freedmen.' 23 "A
republic," he argued, "is a pyramid standing on the broad mass of the
people as a base; but here is a pyramid balanced on its apex.' 1 24 He con-
cluded that, "To call such a government "republican" is a mockery of
sense and decency. A monarch "surrounded by republican institutions,"
as at one time was the boast of France, would be less offensive to correct
principles, and give more security to Human Rights."
125
Although Sumner advocated enfranchisement of all men in every
state, he argued that the conditions in the South, where a huge popula-
tion of newly freed men were unrepresented, mandated a finding that
there was no republican form of government existing in the state. The
fact that a tiny minority of the population in some northern states were
disfranchised was immoral, offensive to his principles of republicanism,
but not as egregious as the conditions in the South which required gov-
ernmental action.
126
From Sumner's perspective, Andrew Johnson veered even further
away from the limits of Article II powers with respect to reconstruction,
than Lincoln. He could not conceivably go along with Johnson's drive to
accept states as reconstituted when they failed to meet minimum repre-
sentative standards as defined by Sumner's views of republicanism. John-
122. Id. at 162.
123. The 1860 census, according to Sumner's speech, demonstrated that there were "5,447,220
whites to 3,656,112 colored persons" in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Equal Rights of All, supra
note 4, at 204. "There is Mississippi, which disfranchises 437,406 citizens, being much more than
one half of its whole 'people'. And there is South Carolina, which disfrancishes 412,408 citizens,
being nearly three fifths of its whole people." Id. at 207.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 213-14.
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son represented a threat to the accomplishment of the synthesis between
the principles of the Declaration of Independence, revolutionary republi-
canism and the Constitution. A synthesis which Sumner believed had
occurred as a result of the Civil War.
After Johnson's veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil
Rights Act in 1865, many of the moderate Republicans began to accept
that a republican form of government might not "require the en-
franchisement of all Negroes everywhere, but it forbade their wholesale
proscription where they were numerous." 127
Moderate Republicans began to realize, that if reconstruction was to
mean anything more than emancipation, a confrontation with their own
President was inevitable. Reports from Louisiana at the same time made
it impossible for them to believe that the provisional government there,
supported by the President, intended to deviate at all from antebellum
policies against Negroes and other unionists.128 '
Reluctant to join Sumner in an attack on Lincoln's early reconstruc-
tion plans, moderate Republicans now joined other radical Republicans
in confronting the presidential authority to oversee reconstruction. The
Majority Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, issued at the
end of the 38th session of Congress, directly attacked the presidential
power to implement reconstruction outside of the limited powers of Arti-
cle II. The report claimed for Congress the power to review and pass
judgment upon the forms of government established in the reconstituted
states, before their readmission to Congress.
129
In September, 1865, Sumner again challenged the Presidential au-
thority to appoint officers in the states "not known to the Constitution or
127. W. WIECEK, supra note 19, at 200.
128. See discussion of the situation in Louisiana by M. L. BENEDICr, supra note 3, at 115-22.
Benedict views Louisiana as providing "the link between wartime and peacetime Reconstruction."
Id. at 118.
129. W. WIECEK, supra note 19, at 201-02. Wiecek views the Majority Report as "the precipi-
tant" for consensus among the Republicans (excluding Sumner who was still insisting upon an en-
dorsement of voting rights for Negroes) and regards this report as the "high water mark of
republican development of the guaranty clause in the first session." He views the second session as
evidence of the implementation of "the theoretical consensus embodied in the report." Id. at 203.
While the report reflects a general and vague consensus, the Republicans had already faced the stark
realities of the events in Louisiana where the intransigent provisional government deluded no one as
to the antebellum sentiments of the presidentially supported officials. The President's veto of critical
reconstruction legislation as well as the growing evidence of similar conditions in other southern
states forced many moderate Republicans to conclude that they could not shirk their own commit-
ments to these ideals in favor of pragmatic political alliances with the president. The refusal of
Congress, in 1865, to recognize the reconstituted governments of these southern states occurred
before they knew or were confident of the results of the upcoming year's congressional elections.
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laws.... The Act of Congress," he pointed out, "authorizing their ap-
pointment [provisional governors] failed to become a law; so that no such
office is 'established by law,' according to the requirements of the
Constitution."130
For Sumner this was nothing new; he had been specifically advocat-
ing congressional responsibility under the Guaranty Clause at least since
1852, and with even more conviction in 1863.' T '
In 1866, Sumner again challenged the admission of Tennessee be-
cause the new constitution still disfranchised over one quarter of its pop-
ulation; again he reminded the members of the Senate that a republican
government, if anything, "is a government founded on the people and the
consent of the governed."'
132
According to Sumner, after the surrender at Appomattox, the rebels
were ready for any terms as long as they could escape with their lives.
They would have agreed to Negro suffrage and provided homesteads for
each newly freed man. 133 An opportunity was lost to fully effectuate the
gains for freedmen won by the war. "Had the national government taken
advantage of this plastic condition, it might have stamped Equal Rights
upon the whole people, as upon molten wax, while it fixed the immutable
conditions of a permanent peace. The question of Reconstruction would
have been settled before it arose."'
134
While moderate Republicans grew anxious to recognize the south-
ern states as legitimate after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Sumner realized that further steps were necessary to provide the condi-
tions that would effectuate the meaning and power of the Amendment.
He urged his colleagues to provide for impartial suffrage, for a homestead
130. National Security and National Faith, supra note 9, at 465-66. It was the duty of Congress
to create the conditions under which the people of the southern governments could create their own
republican form of government. Id.
131. Sumner's utilization of the Guaranty Clause of Article IV of the Constitution is discussed
extensively in W. WIECEK, supra note 19.
132. C. Sumner, Tennessee Not Sufficiently Reconstructed, Speech in the Senate, on a Joint
Resolution Declaring Tennessee again entitled to Senators and Representatives in Congress (July 21,
1866), reprinted in X WORKs 492. As he had done previously with the question of readmission of
Louisiana and admission of Colorado, he introduced a proviso which stated, "[Tihe Act should not
take effect except upon the fundamental condition that within the State there shall be no denial of
the electoral franchise, or of any other rights, on account of race or color, but all persons shall be
equal before the law." Id. at 493. At one time Sumner had supported the idea of representation based
upon the number of registered voters in each state, but he quickly withdrew this proposal as violative
of his basic principles of republicanism.




to every freedman, and for full educational opportunities.'35 As he de-
scribed it, full republicanism could not be meaningfully reconstituted in
the South without "The Four E's,-standing for Emancipation, En-
franchisement, Equality, and Education." '136
V. CONCLUSION
It is curious that Charles Sumner has been branded by history as
such an extremist, albeit a hero to many. There is no doubt that he was
treated as both by different segments of the population during his life-
time. Legal historians, among others, have attributed Sumner's constitu-
tional arguments to manifestations of his idealism with little basis in real
constitutional theory. Lauding his moral convictions on the equality of
man, they suggest that he stretched constitutional argument beyond
plausible reach while endangering federalism by his expansive use of the
Guaranty Clause, interfering with the effectiveness of more practical
moderates who were intent on getting the job done as well as politically
possible.
While Sumner's more moderate colleagues in Congress fought to su-
perimpose recognizable republican forms of government on a shaky, if
not corrupt foundation, Sumner argued to take reconstruction to the
roots of republicanism and restructure the foundations required for any
lasting adherence to the real meaning of republicanism.
In one sense, the battle over reconstruction in the south resembled
the earlier threats to republicanism represented by the Federalists' new
constitutional theory in 1787. In part, antifederalist insistence on small
republics reflected traditional republican emphasis on the initial condi-
tions necessary for a republican form of government. While the argument
may have been portrayed as mere local self-protectionism, the broad out-
line of the concern falls within the ambit of republican theoretical reli-
ance on basic preliminary conditions essential for its survival.
And yet, after the bitter dust of the Reconstruction Era settled, it
was Sumner's theory, rooted in revolutionary republicanism, that articu-
lated a basis for congressional assertion of authority over efforts for re-
construction. It was Sumner's theory, rooted in revolutionary
republicanism, that presented the most plausible justification for the view
that the ratification of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution were legitimate despite Congress' refusal to admit the




representatives of the presidentially approved reconstituted governments
of the southern states. It was Sumner's theory of vacated government
offices, rooted in revolutionary republicanism, that spurned acceptance of
rights of secession, yet allowed for congressional involvement in restruc-
turing southern state governments. It was Sumner's theory of representa-
tive government and the consent of the governed, rooted in revolutionary
republicanism, that repudiated the proposed amendment to allow pro-
portional representation tied to numbers of voters. It was Sumner's the-
ory of republican government, rooted in revolutionary republicanism,
that provided a way to reject the continuance of the black laws, denial of
educational and other social and political rights, as part of newly recon-
stituted southern republican governments. It was Sumner's direct appeal
to the people, rooted in revolutionary republicanism, arming them with
information and statistics and constitutional theory, that helped to mo-
bilize support for the critical elections of 1860 and 1866. It was Sumner's
attack on the military origin of governments, rooted in revolutionary re-
publicanism, that addressed the problems of continued sanction of pre-
sidentially controlled reconstruction after armed insurrection had been
quelled. It was Sumner's theory of synthesis of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Constitution, rooted in revolutionary republicanism,
that attempted to provide a cohesive theory for resolving constitutional
ambiguities. His theories were grounded in the foundations of the past,
yet were treated as aspirations for the future. His reliance on the "conser-
vatism of 1776" motivated his conservatism of the mid-nineteenth
century.
Both Bernard Bailyn, in his seminal work, The Ideological Origins of
the American Revolution, and Gordon Wood, in the much acclaimed
Creation of the American Republic, pay initial respect to the dominance
of the foundational belief by the American people, from the colonial pe-
riod through the constitutional founding, in the principle of the equality
of rights. 13 7 Neither, however, places much emphasis on an analysis of
137. B. BAILYN, supa note 26, at 232-246 where the discussion is focused on the strong beliefs
against slavery. Id. at 307, 317-18; G. WOOD supra note 11, at vii, 70-75, 83, 495; Id. at 572-74; Id. at
607 (for John Adams' view on equality). Wood, in his preface, reports that, "In the final analysis.. .it
was the Americans' habit of thinking 'that all men are created equal in their rights' which had
created their revolution and sustained their freedom." Id. at vii, citing J. BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE
PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EUROPE (1792). He cites one historian, David
Ramsay: "Henceforth their society would be governed, as it had not been in the past, by the princi-
ple of equality-a principle central to republican thinking, the very 'life and soul. . . .'" Id. at 70.
However he concludes that "By republicanism the Americans meant only to change the origin of
social and political pre-eminence not to do away with such preeminence altogether." Id. at 7 1. "Be-
cause the Federalists," according to Gordon Wood, "were fearful that republican equality was be-
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the way this belief molded strains of republicanism in the key social,
political, and economic contexts of the eras with which they dealt.
Efforts by some legal scholars to reconsider the relevance of republi-
canism rely significantly upon the work of Bailyn, Wood and other his-
torians of the genre in seeking a working definition of republicanism.
Concern is voiced by other legal scholars who focus on the exclusion of
women of all colors, all minorities, and other non-mainstream groups
from traditional precepts of republicanism; what relevance can such a
philosophy have for modern political theory other than ultra-reactionary
attacks on individual rights or liberalism? The abandonment of certain
strains of historical work, of certain strains of republican thought in vari-
ous historical contexts, impoverishes the debate and encourages a view of
the expansion of the protection of individual rights as a perversion of the
past.
Other historians have suggested that equality of rights played a
more significant role in American republicanism than reflected in current
legal scholarship.13 Whether this emphasis on equality of rights is ulti-
mately viewed to be part of a very early strain of revolutionary republi-
canism-later rejected by the Federalists, and the people during the
ratification process, or whether, as Charles Sumner, James Otis, Mercy
Otis Warren, and others believed-it represented a core part of our con-
stitutional principles-the role these ideas played in the founding era and
in later periods of social, political, economic and constitutional crisis are
well worth our consideration.
Elucidating the strands of republican theory critical to Sumner's
comprehensive program of reconstruction emphasizes both a tragic lost
opportunity and an inherited tradition. A lost opportunity because Sum-
ner's entire program of reconstruction, had it been adopted, might have
provided new citizens of all races a very different basis for opportunity
and interaction within a reconstituted society. An inherited tradition be-
cause insights are gleaned from the way Sumner's republican theories,
rooted in earlier American republican traditions, incrementally moved
more "moderate" Republicans to accept his philosophy. Questions are
legitimately asked regarding the weight this republican tradition may be
coming 'that perfect equality which deadens the motives of industry, and places Demerit on a
Footing with Virtue,' they were obsessed with the need to ensure that the proper amount of inequal-
ity and natural distinctions be recognized." G. WOOD, supra note 12, at 495.
138. See supra note 17. This study has not meant to diminish the role of other radical republi-
cans who espoused egalitarian theory during the Reconstruction era. The focus has been necessarily
on one individuals theory of republicanism.
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accorded in interpretations of this legislative history of the Republican
Congress of the Reconstruction era.
It is no wonder that Sumner's theory of republicanism was ignored,
misunderstood, or mislabelled as extreme idealism. So much of what he
argued for depended upon an understanding of the conditions under
which republican forms of government thrive. His emphasis on the con-
nection between the people and their government mirrored earlier revo-
lutionary concern for the same necessary conditions of republican
government. His interest was not merely in accomplishing token acquies-
cence with general principles of republican idealism, but in providing the
machinery necessary for a republican form of government to survive in
the reconstituted south. An early champion for securing suffrage for all
men, he recognized that the franchise itself could be rendered ineffectual
if citizens were not also provided opportunities for education, opportuni-
ties for economic equality by virtue of land ownership, as well a full pro-
tections ensuring equality of rights in the social, political and legal
spheres of their new society.
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